Terrorism in Europe

Many of the leading members of the Old IRA, the army of the Republic, joined the new national army of the Irish Free State, while others rejoined civilian life. A small minority, continuing to claim the name 'IRA', waged a bloody civil war against the new Irish Free State civil administration, led by W.T. Cosgrave. This war killed off both well-known Republican leaders, such as Michael Collins, and the Old IRA itself, setting off a chain of splits that would occur regularly over the remainder of the 20th century.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is a paramilitary group which aimed, through armed struggle, to achieve three goals:

- British withdrawal from Ireland;

- the political unification of Ireland through the merging of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland;

- and the creation of an all-Ireland socialist republic.

They are also known as the 'Provos' and the Irish Republican Army. It is most commonly referred to simply as the IRA, but several groups claim this title.

The IRA's campaign against those perceived as standing in the way of its desired aims (which included the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the British Army, the Unionist establishment and, on occasion, the police and army in the Republic of Ireland) played a central role in the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It has been officially on ceasefire since 1997.

The PIRA has several hundred members, as well as tens of thousands of civilian sympathisers on the island of Ireland, mostly in Ulster. However, the movement's appeal was hurt badly by more notorious PIRA bombings widely perceived as 'atrocities', such as the killing of civilians attending a Remembrance Day ceremony at the cenotaph in Enniskillen in 1987, and the killing of two children at Warrington, which led to tens of thousands of people descending on O'Connell Street in Dublin to call for an end to the PIRA's campaign of violence. In the 1990's the IRA moved to attacking economic targets, such as the Baltic Exchange and Canary Wharf, the latter of which killed two civilians.

In recent times the movement's strength has been weakened by operatives leaving the organisation to join hardline splinter groups such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. If the PIRA has enjoyed mass support this has not, historically, been reflected in support for its associated political party, Sinn Fйin, which, until recently, did not receive the support of more than a minority of nationalists in Northern Ireland, or of voters in general in the Republic of Ireland. Sinn Fйin now has 24 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (out of 108), 4 Northern Ireland MPs (out of 18) and 5 TDs (members of the parliament of the Republic of Ireland, out of 166). This is widely perceived as support for the IRA ceasefire and some commentators maintain this support would decrease if the IRA returned to violence.

In the past, the PIRA has received funds and arms from sympathisers in the United States, notably from the Noraid (Irish Northern Aid) organisation. The PIRA has also, on occasion, received assistance from foreign governments and paramilitary groups, including considerable training and arms from Libya and assistance from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). U.S. support has been weakened by the so-called "War against Terrorism", the events of the 11th September 2001 and the discovery of three men (two known members of the IRA and the Sinn Fйin representative in Cuba) in Colombia, allegedly training Colombian FARC guerrillas. These men were eventually acquitted of aiding FARC, and convicted solely on the lesser charge of possessing false passports, however the prosecution appealed the acquittal and the men have now been convicted and sentenced to long jail terms. The three men disappeared while on bail and their whereabouts are still not known. The case was controversial for several reasons, including the heavy reliance on the testimony of a former FARC member and dubious forensic evidence. There was also considerable political pressure from the right-wing government of Alvaro Uribe, members of which had called for a guilty verdict. The organisation has also been accused of raising funds through smuggling, racketeering and bank robberies.

In February 2005 prominent PIRA members were denounced by relatives of Robert McCartney leading to Gerry Adams for the first time calling for the Catholic Community in Northern Ireland to give evidence against the PIRA.

The Provisional IRA's activities have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, 'punishment beatings' of civilians accused of criminal behaviour, robberies and extortion. Previous targets have included the British military, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and Loyalist militants - against all of whom PIRA gunmen and bombers fought a guerrilla war.

PIRA has also targeted British Government officials, Unionist politicians and certain civilians in both Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Many Protestant civilians perceived to have been assisting the British were killed in Northern Ireland, whilst many British civilians were killed during the IRA bombing campaign in England, which was often directed against civilian targets such as pubs, as well as targets of an economic significance.

One of their most famous victims was Lord Louis Mountbatten, killed on August 27, 1979, by a PIRA bomb placed in his boat.

Also many Catholic civilians have been killed by PIRA in Northern Ireland for alleged "collaboration" with the British security forces (i.e. the British army or the RUC). The IRA has also summarily "executed" or otherwise punished suspected drug dealers and other suspected criminals in the past, sometimes after kangaroo trials. IRA members suspected of being British or Irish government informers were also executed, often after interrogation and torture and a kangaroo trial.

It has recently been claimed that elements of the PIRA have been involved in a spate of bank robberies throughout the island of Ireland, allegedly to build up funds to 'pension off' PIRA members and so facilitate disbandment.

The PIRA has been officially on ceasefire since July 1997 (although hardline splinter groups such as the Continuity IRA and so-called Real IRA continue their campaigns). It previously observed a cease-fire from 1 September 1994 to February 1996, after the Downing Street Declaration, although this was ended when the British government refused to talk to Sinn Fein.

When Sinn Fйin and the DUP became the largest parties of the two communities, it was clear that no deal could be made without the support of both parties. They nearly reached a deal in November 2004, but the DUP's insistence on photographic evidence of the decommissing, as had been demanded by Rev. Dr Ian Paisley, meant the failure of the arrangement. The robbery of 26.5 million of pounds from the Northern Bank in Belfast in December 2004, in which two staff members were forced to participate under threat that their families would be killed if they refused. This assessment was echoed by the Garda Siochana Commissioner, Noel Conroy. The two governments, and all political parties bar Sinn Fйin itself have publicly accepted this assessment, with the Police Constable and the Garda Commissioner jointly scheduled to brief the British Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at a meeting in Downing Street in early February.

In late January 2005 Gerry Adams met separately with prime ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. Both men reportedly forcefully told the Sinn Fйin leader of their conviction that the IRA were involved and warned that the IRA's alleged actions could scupper hopes of a re-establishment of the power-sharing government.

In the aftermath of the row over the robbery, a further controversy erupted when, on RTE's Questions and Answers programme, the chairman of Sinn Fйin, Mitchel McLoughlin, insisted that the IRA's controversial killing of a mother of ten young children, Jean McConville, in the early 1970s though "wrong", was not a "crime". Politicians from the Republic, along with the Irish media strongly attacked McLoughlin's comments.

On 20 February 2005, Irish Minister for Justice Michael McDowell publicly accused three of the Sinn Fйin leadership, Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Martin Ferris (TD for Kerry North) of being on the seven-man IRA Army Council. Gerry Adams denied this at an address in Strabane, on the occasion of a ceremony commemorating three IRA men killed by the SAS 20 years ago. Martin McGuinness denied the allegations in a TV interview on RTE.

On 27 February 2005, a republican demonstration against the IRA's murder of Robert McCartney on 30 January 2005 is held in East Belfast. Alex Maskey, a former Sinn Fйin Mayor of Belfast, told relatives to "stop making stupid comments" to the press following Gerry MacKay's demand that Mr Maskey "hand over the 12" IRA members involved.

The Real Irish Republican Army is a paramilitary group founded by former members of the Provisional IRA before the signing of the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. The Real IRA is opposed to the Provisional IRA's 1997 cease-fire and acquiescence in the accord.

It originally attracted disaffected IRA members from the Republican stronghold of South Armagh, and some member in Derry. Its first leader was Michael McKevitt, a former quarter master general of the Provisional IRA, but he has since been imprisoned on charges of directing terrorism. Shortly after its formation, the Real IRA began attacks similar in nature to those conducted by the Provisional IRA prior to its ceasefire. However, it lacked a significant base, and was heavily infiltrated with informers, leading to a series of high profile arrests and seizures by the British and Irish police in the first half of 1998. Despite this, the Real IRA succeeded in bombing Omagh town centre on August 14 1998, killing 29 people. This caused a major outcry in Ireland. Many of its members abandoned the organisation, and the British and Irish police co-operated on an unprecedented scale to destroy the movement.

The Real IRA called a ceasefire in the winter of 1998, but this was broken after less then two years when the organisation conducted a number of attacks on the island of Great Britain, including a taxi-bomb attack on the BBC Television Centre in West London, and a rocket propelled grenade attack on the headquarters of MI6. Since then, it has become weaker and weaker. Infiltration has continued, and the movement has been unable to conduct a noticeable bomb attack. In the fall of 2003, its imprisoned leaders called for an unconditional ceasefire, citing alleged misuse of funds and the futile nature of their resistance to the British presence in Ireland.

In recent times, the Real IRA has continued to be a thorn in the side of both the British and Irish authorities. December 2004 saw 15 fire bomb attacks against premises in Belfast attributed to the breakaway faction. Many see this as a sign of growing support for the group, in light of failed attempts to rescue the Belfast peace accord.

The Real IRA is distinct from the Continuity IRA, another Provisional IRA splinter group founded in 1986.The 32 County Sovereignty Movement is perceived to be the political wing of the Real IRA.

The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is an Irish republican paramilitary group that split from the Provisional IRA in 1986 in a dispute over the attendance of the elected representatives of Sinn Fйin (the political party affiliated to the Provisional IRA) at Dбil Йireann (the lower house of parliament of the Republic of Ireland). The CIRA also styles itself simply as the 'Irish Republican Army' or Уglaigh na hЙireann, but both of these names are also claimed by other groups, including the Provisional IRA.

Contrary to commmon belief, the formation of the CIRA did not arise from the signing of the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and predated that of the Real' IRA. The CIRA opposes the Agreement nonetheless and, as of 2004, unlike the Provisional IRA, the CIRA has not announced a cease fire or agreed to participate in weapons decommissioning. On 13th July, 2004, the US government designated the CIRA as a terrorist organisation, thereby making it illegal for Americans to provide material support to it, requiring US financial institutions to block the group's assets, and denying CIRA members visas into the US.

The CIRA claim to be the true inheritors of an Irish republican tradition that includes the 'Old' Irish Republican Army that fought the 1919-1921 War of Independence, and claims to have attained legitimacy as such in being recognised by Tom Maguire, the last surviving member of the Second Dбil, as the modern incarnation of the old IRA, in what CIRA supporters perceive to be a kind of 'apostolic' succession. These claims are not widely accepted among republicans however.

Activities: CIRA activities have included numerous bombings, assassinations and kidnappings, as well as extortion and robbery. Targets of the CIRA have included British military and Northern Ireland security targets, as well as loyalist paramilitary groups. It has also conducted bomb attacks on predominantly Protestant towns in Northern Ireland. The group is claimed to be the only paramilitary group in Northern Ireland never to have killed or targeted a civilian. As of 2004, the CIRA is not believed to have an established presence or capability of launching attacks on the island of Great Britain.

Strength: In 2004 the United States government believed the CIRA to consist of fewer than fifty fully active members.

External aid: The US government suspected the CIRA of receiving funds and arms from supporters in the United States. It is also believed that, in cooperation with the 'Real' IRA, the CIRA may have acquired arms and materiel from the Balkans.

7. Terrorism in Greece. November 17

November 17 (also known as 17N or N17) was a Marxist Greek terrorist organisation listed in U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Its full name is Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Greek: ЕрбнбуфбфйкЮ ПсгЬнщуз 17 НпЭмвсз, Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri).

N17 had perpetrated a series of attacks from 1975. Until 2002 no member of the group had been identified or arrested. The group is named after the November 17, 1973 uprising by students at the Athens Polytechnic university against the military junta, in which twenty students were killed. Since the military junta was backed by the United States as part of that country's anti-Communist efforts, most of the group's attacks have been directed at American targets.

The group's first attack was in December 1975, when the CIA's Athens station chief was shot. The group has committed further assassinations, often using a 45 caliber handgun, and around fifty other attacks. Initial attacks were aimed at American and Greek officials but the range of operations was expanded in the 1980s and 1990s to include bombings and EU targets. The group is also opposed to Turkey and NATO.

The group wanted to get rid of U.S. bases in Greece, to remove the Turkish military from Cyprus, and to sever Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union.

In June 2000, the group killed Stephen Saunders, a British Defense Attachй. His wife went on television urging the Greek people to help apprehend his killers.

Following a failed operation on June 29, 2002 the Greek authorities captured an injured suspect, Savvas Xiros. His interrogation led to the discovery of two safe houses and to the arrest of a further six suspects, including two brothers of Savvas. A 58 year old professor, Alexandros Giotopoulos, was identified as the group leader and was arrested on July 17 on the island of Lipsi. On September 5, Dimitris Koufodinas, identified as the group's chief of operations, surrendered to the authorities. In all, nineteen individuals were charged with some 2,500 offences relating to November 17's activities. Because of the 20-year statute of limitations, murders before 1984 were not tried by the court.

The trial of the terrorist suspects commenced in Athens on March 3, 2003. On December 8, fifteen of the accused, including Giotopoulos and Koufodinas, were found guilty; another four were acquitted for lack of evidence. The convicted members were sentenced on December 17, with Giotopoulous sentenced to 21 life terms--the heaviest sentence in modern Greek legal history. Koufodinas received 13 life terms. The prosecutor has proposed that Christodoulos Xeros receive 10 life terms; Savvas Xeros six; Vassilitis Tzortzatos four; Iraklis Kostaris one. Lesser sentences are proposed for the remaining nine, in the light of extenuating circumstances.

Defense lawyers of the defendants as well as several civil rights groups have stressed the highly irregular character of the trial. The trial was conducted by a special court with closed doors and the use of television cameras was prohibited. People sympathetic to their causes believe that this was so that it would be easier to condemn all the accused despite very little non-circumstantial evidence. Many of the accused, notably Alexandros Giotopoulos, denied their participation until the end of the year long trial. According to Giotopoulos, he was framed so that the image of a terrorist organization led by a clear leader could be presented. The accused that did admit participation to the group, notably Dimitris Koufondinas who took "full political responsibility for all of the group actions", presented a picture of a loose horizontally organized structure with small cells and decisions taken by discussion and consensus.

Under Greek law, one life term is equal to a 25-year term and a convict may apply for parole after 16 years. If sentenced to more than one life term, he or she must serve at least 20 years before being eligible for parole. Other sentences will run concurrently, with 25-year terms being the maximum and with parole possible after three-fifths of this term are served.

On September 17, 2004, the imprisoned started a hunger strike protesting the especially harsh conditions of their imprisonment and their sensory isolation. According to their statements, "bourgeois democracy" takes revenge on them by enclosing them in "a prison within a prison."

8. Counter-terrorism

Although terrorism has long been a central issue on the UN agenda, commanding an increasingly large focus ever since the September 11th attacks and the subsequent military actions undertaken in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has remained surprisingly silent on the topic of terrorism in Europe. Most of the following resolutions deal with terrorism in general, or with Islamic extremists, not with any particular threats within the European Union; that domain remains to be covered: Resolution 49/60 (1994), Resolution 1269 (1999), and Resolution 1373 (2001).

Clearly, this issue is both sensitive and complex. The difficulty in dealing with it directly stems from the illusive nature of the main actors. No one disputes that terrorists should be punished and deterred, but the challenge lies in identifying degrees of terrorist actions and agreeing on the best way to react. As the old clichй goes, one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.

Previously, terrorists have been successful in negotiating with European nations, thereby granting a degree of validity to their methods. For instance, on 19 January 1975, when 10 people were taken hostage in the Orly airport in France by Arab terrorists, French authorities provided the group with an airplane to fly to Iraq in exchange for the release of the hostages. Similarly, on 27 January of the same year, the June the Second Movement took Peter Lorenz, a German politician, hostage until five terrorists were released from jail and allowed to return to Yemen. In April, 12 hostages were taken in Sweden in exchange for the release of members of terrorists from the Baader-Meinhof gang. It does not seem that this approach is viable in the long-run. Negotiation is extremely dangerous and threatens the future effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures. It shows weakness on the part of the EU and encourages groups to gain recognition of their desires through violence. So, one way of discouraging future attacks is to disprove their political efficacy. The military resources of Europol, of NATO, of the UN, of the sovereign nations of the EU should not go to waste. European states can and should fight back.

The problem with this approach is that it does not distinguish between degrees of action and is not overly sympathetic. Its proponents run the risk of being labeled hypocrites, of seeming terrorist-like themselves, and of alienating moderating forces.

Then there are those who believe that, in the vein of Resolution 1373, the solution to terrorism is financial. Simply put, terrorists need assets to fund their actions. Without money, they will be unable to purchase equipment, organize, or communicate, and consequently, unable to perpetrate any cohesive and effective attacks. Nations should freeze the funds of suspected terrorists and severely punish anyone who is suspected of aiding terrorist organizations.

Unfortunately, as easy and straightforward as this approach sounds, it is extremely problematic. First of all, how do you identify whose assets to freeze? What relationship or suspicion is enough to cut off funds from an individual? And perhaps, more to the point, what of prominent corporations and organizations? If, for instance, some major international bank is suspected of financing terrorists, it cannot effectively be shut down or punished. Sometimes, freezing assets of wealthy individuals or entities can be extremely hurtful to a state's economy and can provoke bitter public criticism that may not seem to be worth the hassle. Finally, it is extremely hard to trace all sources of terrorist funding.

There is also the camp of believers who view the issue of terrorism in a judicial light. The fact that groups commit illegal actions does not mean that states should violate any international norms of behavior in dealing with them. Violence and coercion are not the way to go. Rather, terrorists should be discouraged from acting through strict, predictable, and unrelenting laws.

Codes of conduct and punishments should be such that individuals will find it in their best interests to stay away from any suspected terrorist activity. Stricter punishment, not force, should be the main deterrent. Terrorists who are caught should be tried fairly and openly, and sentenced accordingly. Then there can be no international censure, since no force has been used, and individuals are brought to justice morally and legally.

Once again, this optimistic view is not completely in touch with reality. First is the issue of time delay. Trials can take an extremely long time to reach a final verdict, in the meantime offering a window of opportunity for further terrorist actions. Then, the argument has been made repeatedly that certain religious beliefs hold death as a martyr as holy and noble; legal sentences do not do anything to discourage individuals who hold these beliefs from engaging in terrorist activities. Something more tangible, such as military strength or financial insolvency (i.e. actions that will physically prevent attacks from being carried out), should be the policy, since a moral or legal threat is unlikely to be effective.

One of the most important steps that can be taken in fighting terrorism is the recognition that it does not exist in a vacuum. Terrorist activity has links to issues of transnational crime, immigration, drug trafficking, and numerous other endeavors. As the Italian government states, "The fight against international terrorism must be accompanied by effective measures to combat transnational crime and illegal immigration, with the reinforcement of EUROPOL, and by constant and coordinated control of external borders; by laying down common rules on asylum; by stepping up cooperation arrangements with the countries of origin or transit of the migration flows; and by improving cooperation between Member States on matters relating to visas."

No measure against terrorism will be effective if it does not also take into consideration the issues that are closely related to terrorist action.

There are really no clear-cut bloc positions on this issue. Basically, every member of the European Union opposes terrorism in essence and would like to see something done to combat it. No one would like to be caught voting against an anti-terrorism measure. However, there are some degrees of variation within this general consensus. For instance, while Great Britain is much more likely to agree to a stringent, more military and punitive measure, France may be more likely to opt for a more accommodating solution. In the long run, though, every country has an interest in coming up with an effective solution and all are likely to work together to come up with a compromise measure that will protect them all from terrorist attacks. Every member of the EU is threatened and so every member will work to implement an effective resolution. Where the tension will come in is in the exact strictness and direction the proposal will take.

terrorism europe

Conclusion

The number of European deaths from terror attacks over the last few decades has remained relatively constant. It's our perception of the threat that's changed.

Attacks against 'soft' civilian targets are not new, we can just recall the IRA pub bombings in the 1960s. The concern is that terrorists now seem to be more interested in these targets - it's very difficult to protect every pub or every train in the country.

Then there's the increased threat of Islamic terrorism. The September 11 attacks also ushered in a new era, where the West learned the devastating potential of terrorists prepared to take their own lives. And of course it's possible that such groups have shared, or will share, information and expertise with indigenous organisations and, thus, be continuously expanding.

On the other hand many organisations and particular individuals do their best to challenge the threat and try to combat it.

Political means. Although problematic, peace negotiations in Northern Ireland have seen a halt to the spate of IRA bombings in the 1970s and 80s. Spain's approach to ETA has been uncompromising. Part of the strategy has been to ban ETA's alleged political wing, Batasuna. Anti-terrorist laws have been hardened with mandatory life sentences for anyone convicted of serious terrorist offences.

Legal means. After 25 years of attacks in Greece, November 17 leaders Alexandros Giotopoulos and Dimitris Koufodinas were among 15 sentenced to life in December 2003.

Impact of September 11. Since the New York attacks, intelligence monitoring of Islamic groups has been stepped up, as has co-operation between European agencies. In Britain in particular controversial legislation has been passed giving the police greater powers against terrorist suspects.

Practical means. September 11 has made Europe more twitchy and a greater emphasis has been placed on protecting high-profile targets. In Britain, this has included a mock gas attack on a tube station and the stepping up of the 'ring of steel' security monitoring around London's financial centre.

It is very hard to decide whether terrorism can be unstoppable. But the problem is very acute and gets a lot of attention. Hopefully by uniting the efforts of the governments and its secret police services, NGOs and each and every one of us this terror is going to stop one day.

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