"Grand strategies", military and political doctrines of the United States Of America

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`Grand strategies', military and political doctrines of the United States Of America

The article analyses experience of the USA and the UK in shaping the so called `Grand Strategies' that have historically been drafted under the influence of various threats and challenges. Nowadays, Ukraine also has to work out new approaches towards the national security and defense that are driven by current security environment, annexation of Crimea, and military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine sponsored by Russia. This approach is reflected in the hierarchy of strategic documents of the defense planning.

Aim of research is to study the process of strategic planning in the USA and UK in order to implement its experience for Ukraine.

Strategic planning has been studied by different researchers. B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller introduced the concept of `Grand Strategies', George Kennan was an author of US and NATO `Grand Strategy' towards USSR. Such researches as MacLean G. A., Posen B., Ross A., Tami D., Thomas T. L. have studied evolution of strategies during the Cold War. Lobell S,. Dresner D. W., Doran G. T. Stokes D. have explored US policy in recent times.

Main material. Shift in the security environment was also reflected in almost all the spheres of Russia's life, especially in the fields of both foreign and domestic policy. It also had serious impact on the ideology, narratives, and strategic communications. Very interesting phenomenon is the integration of propaganda and political science; moreover, science becomes integrated into the official state propaganda, and current situation is very similar to the Cold War йpoque with its demand to find out external (and internal) enemies. One of the outcomes of such an approach is preservation of the political, social, and economic models that challenge worldwide trends. military political security document

The above-mentioned tendencies are not new; they can be traced down to the Russian Empire traditions. Many aspects of Putin's doctrine are based on the heritage of previous `Grand Strategies' that are linked to the names of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Unfortunately, due to many objective reasons, the West has lost its scientific and analytical capacities that had been focused on the Soviet Union's/Russia's political actions in the post-Soviet countries. It resulted in the certain inability to predict Russia's desire to restore its foreign policy influence, to renovate its military power, etc. This article was also an attempt to analyze a new Russian strategic concept that is reflected in its official documents, official public statements and narratives that are being dispersed through wide network of the pro-Kremlin experts.

We can mention that political processes both in Ukraine and Russia are deeply interconnected, and attempts to change political sphere in one of them would make deep impact on the policy of the other party. This thesis should be taken into account in the political (including geopolitical) forecasting and in the strategic planning, too.

Strategies, together with numerous derivatives the doctrines, establish the so called multidoctrinal framework. Often `strategies'' are also called as the `doctrines' due to their influence on mobilization in its broad sense, propaganda, and political effect. Strategy, as it is determined in the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is `a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives' (JP 3-0) [12]. In general, the hierarchy of terms and documents that describe various military and political strategies and tactics often reminds the Russian matryoshka doll.

As a criterion for evaluation of the quality of strategy the acronym FAS (Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability) can be used [9]. Another approach has come from the project management and is known by the acronym SMART (Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-related) [Doran, 1981: 35-36].

The mechanism of working out various national level strategies and doctrines in the USA can be studied as an example. This world superpower has a definitely clear set of relevant documents. First of all, we are talking about the so called Grand strategies & High strategies that can be determined as a specific component of the political and defense planning in the US. At the current moment, any other country can hardly challenge the US power. That is why the American `Grand Strategy' is not only a strategy of the national security, but also a leverage partly influencing the international, global, Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, etc. security. The US `Grand Strategy' can be characterized by a clear vision of the state's national interests in combination with the plans of its implementation. Usually, development of such strategies precedes practical steps, but sometimes development of a `Grand Strategy' can be backdated and aimed at explaining or legitimizing certain actions.

Anyhow, these are strategic level documents that are targeted at linking policies of the past and the future. Clearly formulated `Grand Strategy' sets up the framework for interpretation of the crucial aspects of the great policy in its three temporal dimensions. Also, it guarantees both continuity and innovativeness of the policy.

For the first time, the term `Grand Strategies' was introduced by famous British researches and strategists B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller. Later, it was gathered up by the US Academia where `Grand Strategy' has even become a discipline.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart has defined `Grand Strategies' in his classic work `Strategy: The Indirect Approach' (firstly published in 1954). According to his view, the role of the `grand strategy - higher strategy' is to coordinate and to focus all available resources of nation or of an alliance of nations on achievement of political purposes of war that are determined by fundamental policy [Liddell Hart, 1967: 322]. It is important to notice that British researcher classifies `moral resources' as a will of nation to achieve the victory over the enemy.

The biggest contradiction between `Grand Strategies' and based on them practical (doctrinal) documents is contradiction between consistency of principles (political and military dogmas) and horizons of development, ability of `Grand Strategy' to reflect variability of policy both domestic and foreign as a response to threats and opportunities of future.

Another problem is that policy in order to confirm its `strategic' status often has to sustain status quo. It makes strategy more static than variable. From one side it gives advantages of institutional memory. In the US case, it also means that despite any new President's Administration decisive efforts to bring new wise and intellectual changes, rebranding aspirations, it has to adjust to `Grand Strategies' of predecessors [Tami, 2015].

`Grand Strategies' with the aim of persuasion and clarity are used to be personified, linked with notable historic figures (Napoleon, Monroe, Wilson, Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, Reagan, Obama, etc.). After-effect of such a personification is association of such `doctrines-strategies' with quasi-religion.

In its military political meaning, `Grand Strategy', according to the above-mentioned Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, should be told from the `Theater strategy' that is a strategy of actions on the theatre of operations or purely military strategies that determines ways of achievement by military means targets outlined by `Grand Strategy' [Dresner, 2011].

Specific feature of the `Grand Strategy' is its wide horizons that, according to B. Liddell Hart, are not limited by the problems of war and victory, because its aim is not only to win the war, but to win peace. In other words, this wider picture, for example, gives to wartime strategy the ability to answer crucial questions of the post-war world.

`Grand strategy' is usually a product of political struggle both external and domestic and also a result of compromise among (counter-) interactive political forces. For example, coherent `Grand Strategy' on the post WWII organization of the world is mostly a result of the historical meetings of American, Soviet and British leaders in Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945).

Beginning of the Cold War is often linked to `Truman Doctrine' that proclaimed `Grand Strategy' of isolation (insulation) of the Soviet Union and its allies. The idiom `Iron curtain' has been offered to broad audience by W. Churchill in his famous Fulton speech (1946). Professional audience also received a concept of `containment' by George Kennan [Deni, 2015].

One of the key problems to be solved by `Grand Strategy' is an estimation of soft and hard power potentials and respectively achievement of their reasonable balance in the form of `smart power', i.e. a combination of military and non-military foreign policy tools. Among the non-military tools, first of all, are diplomatic, economic, information and legal, but also cultural, technological, etc. means and factors.

In real politic and economic surroundings, research and achievement of such optimums are a very complex problem. Moreover, one has to deal with quite specific issues, for example, lobbying pressure from various elites - political, industrial, and military.

Probably, constant pressure of the above-mentioned lobbying groups can explain the fact that the most influential countries of the world in their foreign policy overestimate military tools and underestimate non-military ones. In particular, in 2015, during the preliminary discussion on results of 8-year term of the President Obama's Administration, one of the reasons for critique was the fact that, despite early promises, they didn't downsized influence of military means in the US foreign policy [Stokes, 2003: 569-585].

Barry Posen and Andrew Ross state that there are four main trends (versions) of the US `Grand Strategy' regarding the world order and the US foreign and security policy in the `postCold War world':

• neo-isolationism;

• selective engagement;

• cooperative security;

• primacy.

It is interesting that Barry Posen considers the American `Grand Strategy' during the presidency of Barack Obama as efforts to reach a “liberal hegemony” that makes its practical implementation “wasteful, costly, and counterproductive” [Posen, 1997: 5-53].

Amongst the guiding documents that implement and, in accordance with the context, specify `Grand Strategy', national security strategy (NSS) can probably be named as the key one. In particular, it gives proper role and place to armed forces in broad strategic context and also combines defense component with other foreign policy tools.

Specially established by the President Reagan `the Packard Commission' or `The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management' resulted in - The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 [Posen, 2014: 24]. This legal act has dramatically changed the process of defense management and planning for the first time since 1947, when The National Security Act was adopted and the US Department of Defense was established [6]. As a result of these changes, every President the USA since Ronald Reagan is obliged to present his vision of the national security strategy to get approval by the Congress during the determined term after the elections.

In general, during the 28-year period (1987-2015) five US presidents worked out 14 national security strategies, or NSS. They were distributed as follows:

1. Ronald Reagan - 2 NSS (1988, 1989);

2. George H. W. Bush - 3 NSS (1990, 1991, 1993);

3. Bill Clinton - 7 NSS (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001);

4. George W. Bush - 7 NSS (2002, 2006);

5. Barack Obama - 2 NSS (2010, 2015).

An excellent example is the 8-year presidential term of Bill Clinton when the strategies were literally annual. The only exception was the year of1999. Titles of NSS are representative and reflect appropriate targets and their guiding principles:

2001 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age;

2000 A National Security Strategy for a New Century;

1998 A National Security Strategy for a New Century;

1997 A National Security Strategy for a New Century;

1996 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement;

1995 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement;

1994 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement;

The first three NSS (1994-1996) were focused on the `engagement' and `enlargement'. Engagement was used in the context of building new relations with Russia and other post-Soviet countries and its former allies including Ukraine. Enlargement probably was about growing influence of the USA and perspective NATO advances to the East.

In the 1990-s, the Russian Federation that suffered from serious economic crisis could not resist the `enlargement' trend. To the contrary, `enlargement' policy gave to Russia the place in G7 changing it into G8.

Shift of Bill Clinton's Administration policy toward Russia is well described by George MacLean book `Clinton's Foreign Policy in Russia: From Deterrence and Isolation to Democratization and Engagement'.

As it is known, the Russian Federation was suspended from G8 on 24 March 2014 as a result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. This interdiction of the Russian Federation from G7 was an evidence of collapse of `engagement' policy. Nevertheless, democrats have not abandoned it yet. For example, Democratic nominee for the presidential campaign the United States 2016 Hillary Clinton during election campaign 2015-2016 always underlined that there is no alternative to `engagement' policy towards Russia [MacLean, 2006: 162].

However, taking into account violent behavior of Putin's Russia, the policy of `wise engagement' is increasingly looking like an appeasement policy that some European countries conducted towards the Nazi Germany on the eve of the WWII [25].

A new version of the appeasement policy can also be called as `strategic tolerance' of the US, the EU and the West in general to Putin's Russia. The weakness of this policy regarding the Ukrainian crisis is primarily in the non-recognition of the fact that this crisis is not an internal conflict in Ukraine and even not military conflict between the two countries - Russia and Ukraine - outside the EU frontiers, but a hybrid continental war unleashed by Moscow where the EU is rather not an arbitrator, but one of the participants [Lobell, 2013].

The NSS during the presidency of George W. Bush worked out under the impact of 9/11 had offensive nature contrary to `peacekeeping' documents issued by his democratic predecessors. Their key concept was preemptive war which meant that the US national security envisaged preemptive (preventive) use of force aiming to fill the security gaps or vacuums that could benefit terrorists.

Strategies and doctrines of that period determined the source of the `world evil'. It was widely used, in particular, the concept of `countries that sponsor terrorism' and even specifically named four of them - North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya.

The first Barak Obama's NSS of 26 May 2010 [7] has dramatically broken the continuity with those documents, signed by his predecessor, the Republican George W. Bush in 2002 and 2006. President Obama claimed to extend the policy of `engagement' in all the key centers of influence, including China, India, Russia and such `raising nations' as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia.

Barak Obama's NSS and the policy of `resetting' relations with Russia he had proclaimed were not as naive as they were depicted by critics of the Obama Administration from the Republican camp. One should take into consideration that `engagement' in the interpretation of the Obama Administration was based on the Doctrine of Restraint which was mainly defensive. The latest actual National Security Strategy that was signed by the President Barack Obama in February 2015 [8] is also focused on the above-mentioned doctrine of restraint. While this Strategy was developed against the backdrop of outright Russian aggression against Ukraine, it was purely defensive in nature and, therefore, often subjected to harsh criticism from both within America and abroad. In particular, the fundamental rejection of the US transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine and distancing the United States from direct participation in the settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia (US preferred to work through its allies, i.e. Germany and France in the `Minsk format') rose criticism of the US foreign policy in this direction.

Among other key developments of national security policy done by Obama's Administration the USA Freedom Act (2015) should be mentioned. This legal act has limited the powers of the National Security Agency. The Joint Staff Committee has been restructured.

Developing the ideas embodied in the NSS, the US laid the foundation to the Quadrennial Defense Review with its key element named as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) to be signed by the Secretary of the Department of Defense. The NDS is a practical tool of implementation of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere. Further process of planning, programming, budgeting and execution of targets is following.

The National Military Strategy is a document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and designed to support NSS goals and the implementation of the NDS. This document describs how the Armed Forces plan in achieving military objectives in the distant future and the vision of the Armed Forces response to the threats and challenges.

Guidance of the Development Employment of Force (GEF), being detailed by Unified Command Plan (UCP) and NDS, is the basis for strategic political leadership, planning military campaigns and also for Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

We also should mention the National Response Framework that is developed by the Department of Homeland Security. This document is designed to assess wide range of national level threats and different ways of its management and counteraction.

Usually various doctrines are worked out as a development of strategies. A doctrine (from Latin `doctrina') initially means a system of dogmas, core of some religion, ideology etc., `cat- echesis'. It means that doctrine is both the result of strategy and its integral part that is aimed on establishment and preservation of certain political and military status quo.

A `doctrine' in the military and political aspect contains concentrated views on foreign, defense and security policies which are inherent to a particular historical period that are clearly articulated by political leaders another important issue is that it also has to be shared by national political, economic, and military elites.

Strategic documents of the `doctrine' level usually reflect the official views and arguments (theses) related to targets, assessments of military and political environment and concepts (principles and methods) of activity, including the so called `good practices'. It has as an aim to ensure safe operation of the state as a whole in actual military and political context. Modern type doctrines also take into account the interests of individuals and entities, including businesses and other entities that do not have legal status.

The US Department of Defense in the above-mentioned Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms determines doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.” It is mentioned also that doctrine “is authoritative but requires judgment in application” [12].

The US definition of doctrine corresponds with the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions that determines doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application”. By the way, the NATO definition is of 1 March 1973 [19].

Timothy Thomas offers six considerations that the military and technical dimension of military doctrine embraces:

1) the character (nature) of the military threat;

2) the type and struggle that may result (future war);

3) the requirements for defense (historical paradigm about how war begins, its initial period, timing, and interaction of technology);

4) the armed forces required (strategic posture, mobilization, and deployment);

5) the means to conduct armed struggle and the use of the armed forces (force generation, manning, and equipping);

6) preparation of the armed forces to accomplish these tasks (training, etc.) [Thomas, 1991: 594-620].

From the perspective of the `realpolitik' (its initial formulation usually attributed to Niccolo Machiavelli) or `political realism' by Hans Morgenthau [Morgenthau, 1985: 688], any type of foreign policy is closely related to its military and political-military doctrine and should always be guided by the following pragmatic provisions:

• international or regional world order is derived from the mighty of the superpower, which is able to sustain it by dominance on other states or by the balance of power between the two superpowers (alliances) on a certain historical period;

• any actions regarding other countries must be based on sufficient level of capabilities and opportunities; security of the country is directly proportional to its power;

• to develop specific plans and especially try to implement them without possessing sufficient power is unwise and dangerous;

• influential country should maintain an advantageous imbalance in the immediate vicinity (Divide et impere!);

• where necessary, state should act in advance, preventively, avoiding strengthening the enemies or their alliances;

• any alliance doesn't guarantee absolute security;

• defeat of another state should not be overestimated.

Despite all of the persuasiveness, arguments of realpolitik supporters have one significant weakness: they usually do not take into account cultural differences of different regions and peoples of the world that find its reflection in foreign policy, security and military way of thinking - `strategic culture'.

Analysts of Strategic Studies Institute that operates under U.S. Army War College consider that major reason of defeat of Soviet Union and later Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya (primarily meant first Chechen war) was a neglect of enemies strategic thinking [Cassidy, 2003].

Great analytical and prognostic efforts precede the adoption of doctrines and strategies. It includes strategic foresight, short-term horizon scanning and national risk assessment.

The next stage of strategic planning includes drafting and rationalization of assumptions that reflect adequate reaction to the challenges and threats, selection priorities, etc.

Then required and existing capabilities are being evaluated with an ultimate goal to find possible ways of overcoming gaps between the real and desired state.

Over time, the `doctrine' is revised and edited. As an example, the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States (approved on 25 March 2013) compared to its previous versions of 2007 and 2009, has the following changes:

• the introduction was enriched with theory;

• there was a section devoted to the interaction of different types of forces with appropriate concepts and assessments;

• implemented taxonomy (hierarchical classification) in respect of concepts - war, warfare, military campaign, military operation etc.;

• implemented taxonomy in respect of concepts - policy (foreign policy), strategy, doctrine and concepts;

• implemented and outlined `global synchronizer' concept;

• the Department of Defense role was specified in relation to conduction information operations aimed to enhance the efficiency of the planning and execution of military operations;

• broad interpretation of the role of command communication in process of synchronization and information operations was given;

• the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance was outlined as a substitution to the Joint Forces Command;

• the concept of `total force fitness' was implemented for evaluation joint service;

• Joint Pubs (JP) were considered as a tool of decreasing the level of duplication and simultaneously improving continuity [12].

The US and NATO experience of strategic planning in defense and security area is widely used by Ukraine at a new stage of its development associated with the aggravation of relations with Russia to military and political conflict.

On 6 May 2015, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) adopted a new National Security Strategy [4]. This document is primarily focused on new security environment and threats that are caused by the Russian military aggression.

Subsequently, on 2 September 2015, the NSDC adopted a new Military Doctrine of Ukraine. This document which is dramatically different from the previous military doctrines adopted in independent Ukraine, determines that the Military Doctrine is a `system of views on the reasons, nature and character of modern armed conflicts, principles and ways of its prevention, preparation of States to possible armed conflict, as well as the use of military force to protect state sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests'.

A new military doctrinal document describes the challenges and threats in defense domain, their possible scenarios. These are `temporary occupation by the Russian Federation of territory of Ukraine - Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia inciting armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine and the destruction of the global and regional security systems and violation on the principles of international law...' [1].

On 27 January 2016, the NSDC also adopted new innovative document - the Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine that foresees development of national cybersecurity system, detection, preventing of cyber threats such as cyber espionage, cyber crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare [5].

On 4 March 2016, the NSDC approved the Concept of the Development of Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine [2].

The Concept is to determine ways to form the national security and defense capabilities that allow:

• to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity within the internationally recognized state border of Ukraine;

• to guarantee the peaceful future of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, democratic, social state ruled bylaw;

• to ensure to establish the national crisis response system, early detection, prevention and neutralization of external and internal threats to national security;

• to ensure the personal safety, constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen provide cybersecurity;

• to give rapid joint response to crisis situations and emergencies.

Development of defense and security sector focuses on increasing the operational capabilities of the security and defense forces and their readiness to rapid response on the challenges and threats to national security of Ukraine. Main issues to do that are the following:

• creating an effective system of management of security and defense sector as an integrated functional system;

• combining operational capabilities of the components of the security and defense sector to provide timely and adequate response to crisis situations;

• holding security and defense forces in readiness to perform assigned tasks;

• improving the planning system of the defense and security sector, sustainable use of public resources.

This concept reflects the vision of the development of security and defense capabilities of Ukraine in the medium term range based on the assessment of security environment and state financial and economic capabilities within the Comprehensive Security and Defense Sector Review. This document practically has finished the process of development of strategic documents in defense planning and has set up framework for their implementation.

So, we can state that Ukraine's `Grand strategy' has been formulated by set of strategic documents in defense and national security planning that are corresponding to experience of our European and Euro-Atlantic partners. Process of planning was deeply influenced by current security situation and it was an attempt to find out adequate solution with respect to limited resources. Our country now is in the next stage of implementation of outlined roadmap which has been set up by abovementioned documents.

References

1. Воєнна доктрина України. Рішення РНБО від 2 вересня 2015 р. [The Military Doctrine of Ukraine. The NSDC Decision, 2 September 2015], <http://www.president.gov.ua/doc- uments/5552015-19443/>

2. Концепція розвитку сектору безпеки і оборони України. Рішення РНБО від 4 березня 2016. [The Concept of the Development of Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine. The NSDC Decision, 4 March 2016], <http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/documents/418.html/>

3. Стратегія кібербезпеки України. Рішення РНБО від 27 січня 2016 р. [The Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine. The NSDC Decision, 27 January 2016], <http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/ documents/417.html/>

4. Стратегія національної безпеки. Рішення РНБО від 6 травня 2015 р. [The National Security Strategy of Ukraine. The NSDC Decission, 6 May 2015], <http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/ documents/396.html/>

5. Public Law 99-433 99^th Congress, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE- 100-Pg992.pdf/>

6. The National Security Act of 1947, Washington DC, <http://legisworks.org/congress/80/ publaw-253.pdf/>

7. US National Security Strategy 2010, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/>

8. US National Security Strategy 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ docs/ 2015_national_secu/>

9. Directives and Instructions, Defense Department Intelligence and Security Doctrine, <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/Biddle/>

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12. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010), as amended through 15 November 2015, JP 1-02, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf/>

13. Doran G. T. (1981) `There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management's goals and objectives', Management Review (AMA FORUM) 70 (11): 35-36.

14. Dresner D. W. (2011) `Does Obama have a great strategy?', Foreign Affairs July/August Issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strat- egy/>

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16. Lobell S. (2013) `Engaging the enemy and the lessons for the Obama Administration', Political Science Quarterly 128(2): 261-287 <https://www.academia.edu/9415686/Engag- ing_the_Enemy_and_the_Lessons_for_the_Obama_Administration/>

17. MacLean G. A. (2006) Clinton s foreign policy in Russia: From deterrence and isolation to democratization and engagement. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Pub Co.

18. Morgenthau H., Thompson K. (1985) Politics Among Nations. New York: McGraw-Hill.

19. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2008). Listing terms of military significance and their definitions for use in NATO: AAP-6. <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf/>

20. Posen B. (2014) Restraint: A new foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

21. Posen B., Ross A. (1997) `Competing Visions for U. S. Grand Strategy', International Security 21 (3): 5-53.

22. Stokes D. (2003) `Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: The US war of terror in Colombia', Review of International Studies 29: 569-585.

23. Tami D. (2015) Strategy and Grand Strategy: What students and practitioners need to know. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, <http://permanent.access. gpo.gov/ gpo64717/pub1305.pdf/>

24. Thomas T. L. (1991) `The Soviet military on Desert Storm: Redefining doctrine?, Journal of Soviet Military Studies 12: 594-620.

25. REUTERS, Hillary Clinton calls for constant engagement with Putin, 7 April 2015, <http://europe.newsweek.com/hillary-clinton-calls-constant-engagement-putin- 329794?rm=eu/

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