Economy of Qing Empire

The key to British victory was Her Majesty's Navy, which used the broadside with equal effect against wooden-hulled vessels, fortifications are river mouths, and city walls. The steel-hulled Nemesis, a shallow-draft armed paddle-wheeler loaned to the campaign by the British East India Company, quickly controlled the river basins and the Pearl River between Hong Kong and Canton, regardless of winds or tides that limited the effectiveness of Chinese junks. On land, Chinese bows and primitive firelocks proved no match for British muskets and artillery. For leading the Royal Marines to victory General Anthony Blaxland Stransham was knighted by Queen Victoria. His forces utterly defeated on land and sea, Lin Ze-xu in September 1840 had been recalled to Peking in disgrace, and Qi-shan, a Manchu aristocrat related to the Emperor, installed in Lin's place to deal with the foreign devils whose decisive victories were undermining the authority of the Qing Dynasty, which gradually lost control of a population of 300 million.

The outbreak of fresh hostilities under such circumstances was almost inevitable because Chinese officials were extremely reluctant to enact the terms of the treaties of 1842-44. Since the French and Americans had extracted additional concessions since the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, including clauses about renegotiation after twelve years, Great Britain insisted upon exercising its "most-favoured nation status" in 1854. This time, the British demanded that China open all her ports to foreign trade, legalise the importation of opium from British possessions in India and Burma, exempt British goods from all import duties, and permit the establishment of a full embassy in Peking. For two years Qing court officials stalled, trying to buy time. However, events ran out of their control when on 8 October 1856 officials boarded the Chinese-registered but Hong Kong-based merchant vessel Arrow, which they suspected of involvement in both smuggling and piracy. The British trade officials naturally argued that as a foreign vessel the Arrow's activities did not fall under Chinese legal jurisdiction, and that therefore the sailors who had been arrested should be released under the extraterritoriality clause of the Treaty of Nanking.

Having dealt with the temporary distraction of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, in 1857 Great Britain dispatched forces to Canton in a coordinated operation with American warships. France, seething over the recent Chinese execution of a missionary, Father August Chapdelaine, joined Russia, the U. S. A., and Great Britain against China. However, a joint Anglo-French force, without other military assistance, under the command of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, Lord Elgin, and Marshall Gros seized Canton late in 1857 after valiant but futile resistance by the city's citizens and Chinese soldiers. In May 1858, the Anglo-French naval taskforce captured the Taku forts near Tiensin (Tianjin), effectively ending hostilities. France, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain then forced China to agree to open eleven more major ports to Western trade under the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin (June 1858). When the Chinese once again proved slow to enact the terms of the treaty, Britain order Admiral Sir James Hope to shell the Chinese forts at the mouth of the Peiho River in 1859. The Chinese capitulated, permitting all foreigners with passports to travel freely in China, and granting Chinese who converted to Christianity full property rights.

Since Chinese officials once again refused to enact a treaty provision, namely the establishment of Western embassies in Peking, an Anglo-French force launched a fresh offensive from Hong Kong in 1860, ultimately destroying the Emperor Xianfeng's Summer Palace in Chengde, and the Summer Palace and the Old Summer Palace in Peking amidst wide-spread looting by both troops and civilians.

Under the terms of the Convention of Peking, signed by Prince Gong, brother of the Emperor Xianfeng, on 18 October 1860, the ports of Hankou, Niuzhuang, Danshui, and Nanjing were opened to foreign vessels, as were the waters of the Yangtze, and foreign missionaries were free to proselytize. China had to pay further reparations, this time ten million taels, to each of France and Britain, and another two million taels to British merchants for destruction of property. Finally, China ceded the port of Kowloon to Great Britain, and agreed to permit the export of indentured Chinese labourers to the Americas. Arguably, without such a massive injection of cheap labour the transcontinental railways of the United States and Canada would not have been completed so quickly and economically. On the other hand, China's humiliation led directly to the fall of the Manchu Dynasty and the social upheavals that precipitated the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.

What had begun as a conflict of interests between English desire for profits from the trade in silk, porcelain, and tea and the Confucian ideal of self-sufficiency and exclusion of corrupting influences resulted in the partitioning of China by the Western powers (including the ceding of Hong Kong to Great Britain), humiliating defeats on land and sea by technologically and logistically superior Western forces, and the traditional values of an entire culture undermined by Christian missionaries and rampant trading in Turkish and Indian opium. No wonder the Boxer rebels' chief goal was to purify and reinvigorate their nation by the utter annihilation of all "foreign devils."

III. Qing Empire in the system of world trade

After 1683 the Qing rulers turned their attention to consolidating control over their frontiers. Taiwan became part of the empire, and military expeditions against perceived threats in north and west Asia created the largest empire China has ever known. From the late 17th to the early 18th century, Qing armies destroyed the Oirat empire based in Dzungaria and incorporated into the empire the region around the Koko Nor (Qinghai Hu, “Blue Lake”) in Central Asia. In order to check Mongol power, a Chinese garrison and a resident official were posted in Lhasa, the centre of the Dge-lugs-pa (Yellow Hat) sect of Buddhism that was influential among Mongols as well as Tibetans. By the mid-18th century the land on both sides of the Tien Shan range as far west as Lake Balkhash had been annexed and renamed Xinjiang (“New Dominion”). Military expansion was matched by the internal migration of Chinese settlers into parts of China that were dominated by aboriginal or non-Han ethnic groups.

The evacuation of the south and southeast coast during the 1660s spurred a westward migration of an ethnic minority, the Hakka, who moved from the hills of southwest Fujian, northern Guangdong, and southern Jiangxi. Although the Qing dynasty tried to forbid migration into its homeland, Manchuria, in the 18th and 19th centuries Chinese settlers flowed into the fertile Liao River basin. Government policies encouraged Han movement into the southwest during the early 18th century, while Chinese traders and assimilated Chinese Muslims moved into Xinjiang and the other newly acquired territories. This period was punctuated by ethnic conflict stimulated by the Han Chinese takeover of former aboriginal territories and by fighting between different groups of Han Chinese.

The development of the Qing military system can be divided into two broad periods separated by the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). The early Qing military was rooted in the Eight Banners first developed by Nurhachi as a way to organize Jurchen society beyond petty clan affiliations. There are eight banners in all, differentiated by colours. The banners in their order of precedence were as follows: yellow, bordered yellow (i.e. yellow banner with red border), white, red, bordered white, bordered red, blue, and bordered blue. The yellow, bordered yellow, and white banners were collectively known as the "Upper Three Banners" (Chinese: ЏгЋOЉш; pinyin: shang sвn qi) and were under the direct command of the emperor. Only Manchus belonging to the Upper Three Banners, and selected Han Chinese who had passed the highest level of martial exams were qualified to serve as the emperor's personal bodyguards. The remaining Banners were known as "The Lower Five Banners" (Chinese: ‰єЊЬЉш; pinyin: xia wu qi) and were commanded by hereditary Manchu princes descended from Nurhachi's immediate family, known informally as the "Iron Cap Princes" (simplified Chinese: ?ґU¤l¤э; traditional Chinese: иc–XЋq‰¤; pinyin: tie maozi wang). Together they formed the ruling council of the Manchu nation as well as high command of the army.

As Qing power expanded north of the Great Wall in the last years of the Ming Dynasty, the Banner system was expanded by Nurhachi's son and successor Hong Taiji to include mirrored Mongol and Han Banners. After capturing Beijing in 1644 and as the Manchu rapidly gained control of large tracts of former Ming territory, the relatively small Banner armies were further augmented by the Green Standard Army, which eventually outnumbered Banner troops three to one. The Green Standard Army so-named after the colour of their battle standards was made up of those Ming troops who had surrendered to the Qing. They maintained their Ming era organization and were led by a mix of Banner and Green Standard officers. The Banners and Green Standard troops were standing armies, paid for by central government. In addition, regional governors from provincial down to village level maintained their own irregular local militias for police duties and disaster relief. These militias were usually granted small annual stipends from regional coffers for part-time service obligations. They received very limited military drills if at all and were not considered combat troops.

Russian-Qing economic relation

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The Qing was China's last centralized dynasty. During its almost three-hundred-year-long reign, it achieved regional supremacy before sliding into a decline that occurred contemporaneously with the West's rise to global pre-eminence. The expansion of the Western world inevitably led to the disintegration of China's centuries-old tribute system, and changes in the way the Qing government interacted with its foreign counterparts. The establishment of a foreign ministry in the 1860s and the assignment of the first permanent diplomatic envoys abroad in the 1870s signalled the Qing dynasty's gradual adoption of a Western, more modernistic, system of diplomacy. Researchers raise several explanations for China's diplomatic clashes with Western countries and the ultimate changes in its foreign policy behavior. They include the shift in the balance of power from East to West, fundamental changes in Qing ideals, sense of identity and preferences and the conflicting systems of these two, quite different civilizations. The focus of this essay is on material and ideational explanations. The material explanation maintains that Qing foreign policy behavior adjusted in order to maximize China's material interests in view of the shift in power dynamics between East and West. From the ideational standpoint, adjustments to Qing foreign policy behavior were the result of changes in the preferences, values and behavioral norms of China's rulers. The aim of this essay explores the basis of change in Qing dynasty foreign policy and determines whether its behavioral adjustments were as a result of ideational or material factors.

The concept of `ideas' is not always clear in context of the argument that ideas propel changes in the behavior of nations. Certain scholars argue that ideas are akin to power and interests insofar as being important variables when explaining state behaviour. Robert H. Jackson, however, argues that the post-World War II decolonization movement cannot be explained in terms of power or interests; that ideas and norms constitute the leading explanation for this phenomenon. This explanation places ideas in direct opposition to interests and power. Although the definition of ideas often seems clear in context, using the term as an explanatory variable can sometimes lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Such misapprehensions are attributable to ideas and interests at times, and times not, coinciding. Ideas encompass desires and knowledge and constitute the actor's interests; they are its aspirations. Knowledge involves an actor's expectations but not its interests. As Alexander Wendt notes, `not all ideas are interests; in fact, most are not'. Interests form part of an actor's ideas (in view of ideas also being capable of constructing the actor's identity, thereby changing its preferences) but not their entirety. Arguing whether it is ideas or interests that produce an affect, therefore, is likely to generate conceptual confusion and divergent understandings. From an ideational standpoint, it is the material, rather than interests, that opposes ideas. An explanation that treats ideas and interests as different sources of behaviour is likely to conclude that ideational interests are in opposition to material interests. An explanation that views the concept of power and interests in opposition may be understood on the premise of the actor's preferences remaining constant. An ideational explanation, however, stems from a change in the actor's perceptions of its interests. In either case, employing “ideas” to explain behavioural changes necessitates identification of the changes in the actor's concept of its interests, that is, its sense of identity, value system and standards of behaviour.

Ideational and material interpretations of adjustments in Qing foreign policy necessitate distinguishing purely material, materially cognitive, and purely conceptual explanations.

Purely material interpretations of state behaviour are based on the objective distribution of tangible power. Aspirations, beliefs, and other ideas are not considered as relevant variables. This type of analysis is generally championed by Realist scholars. Perhaps, the most representative example is Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics. With Waltz's theoretical framework, state behavior is largely determined by the pressure generated by the international system, and therefore cannot be viewed as an expression of a nation's subjective desires. Waltz argues that the structure of the system works as a selecting function because structures select by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others, outcomes cannot be inferred from intentions and behavior. Insofar as selection rules, results can be predicted whether or not the actors' intentions and whether or not they understand structural constraints are known. In other words, the actor may or may not be cognizant of structural restrictions on its behavior or, although aware of them, may not necessarily behave in the way most likely to be rewarded, or least likely to be punished; it is the structure that plays the main role as regards the effect of the actor's choice, structure being the deciding factor as to what kind of competitor is most likely to succeed. Within this theory the actor's ideas, therefore, are unimportant.

One variance in this body of logic maintains that material factors have a strong bearing on ideational elements. That is to say, in time actors' ideas adapt to the material reality, the underlying logic being that erroneous cognition of the outside world could lead actors to suboptimal situations that ultimately cause them to adjust their behavior. As material factors provide impetus for such a process, it may be classed as a material explanation.

As regards the international system, cognitive material-based interpretations, in common with purely material explanations, proceed on the assumption that there has been no change in the actors' preferences. Cognitive material explanations concern the behaviour of nations as it is affected by the actors' level of cognition of the international environment, the power dynamics among states, and the capabilities of rivals. They account for the situation where, despite all material factors remaining constant, changes in an actor's cognition of the outside world result in behavioral adjustments.

Information is a body of accumulated, world-related data. A general understanding of it is manifest in an objective view of the world. Explaining the behavior of an enterprise from an economics standpoint requires much more information than the functions of cost and demand; other factors, such as the industry's history, also imbue a great deal of useful information relevant to understanding enterprise behavior. Similarly, in international relations, the information on which a country bases its view of the outside world is likely to be based predominantly on the balance of power, manifest in forms and modes of behavior. Variances in these two factors can lead to differences in state behavior. When inferring a country's behavior, an analysis at the unit level, necessitates a substantial fund of relevant knowledge, including expectations of behavior. An analysis based on preferences and desires, rather than knowledge of the outside world, cannot determine how an actor will behave because desires do not fully account for the conditions under which action occurs. An actor's knowledge and expectations do not feature in the content of many rational choice-based analyses because their hypothetical actors have complete knowledge.

Similarly, the knowledge that nations will always strive to enhance their security and economic interests is insufficient to predict how they will act. Other kinds of information, such as the state under observation's knowledge of the international system, of its own strength and the reliability of its partners, are relevant when predicting its behavior. Scholars have demonstrated beyond doubt the utility of additional information of this nature in understanding state behavior. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, for example, have shown that it is policymakers' perception of the offence-defense balance rather than the actual disparity between offensive and defensive capabilities that influences a nation's balancing behavior. The actor that attaches most importance to material factors necessarily acts on the basis of certain knowledge and information. That an individual strives to achieve an objective within a limited scope of choice is supported by rational choice theory. On this basis, the individual chooses the action it perceives as most helpful in achieving its objective, and it is rational behaviour that guides the way to the goal in question. Such an actor will always strive to achieve the optimum result. Yet, rational choices are all made under a set of constraints, cognition of which is an essential aspect of the decision making process within the rational choice model. Actors require certain knowledge and information in order to be able to evaluate the likely costs and benefits of their actions. For example, if Country A has 50 cannon, while its rival, Country B, has 100, Country A will be disinclined to instigate conflict. If, however, faulty information leads Country A mistakenly to believe that its rival has only ten cannon, Country A's `knowledge' of its adversary's capabilities may have significant ramifications as regards changes in its behavior. Using similar reasoning, cognitive material explanations view the actual power discrepancy between China and the West as less important than the Qing government's perceptions of the balance of power when interpreting its foreign policy decisions.

Decision-making within cognitive material explanations is nonetheless based on consideration of material factors rather than ideational interests. In this view, the only variables that lead a nation to change its behavior are those of information and knowledge. In other words, varying evaluations of material factors on the part of a nation can lead to differences in its behavior.

Sometimes the distinction between material cognitive strength and material explanations becomes blurred. Material cognitive strength explanations adhere to the logic whereby it is a nation's consideration of its material interests that leads to perception of relevant material factors that acts as the catalyst for a change in national behavior. Within this type of analysis, material factors remain the fundamental cause of action. It could consequently be interpreted as a material explanation. Consider, for example, the following seemingly straightforward material explanation: `the thief came by so everyone ran away'. This explanation implies that `everyone' recognizes the thief for what he is and is able to predict his behaviour. In other words, even though the background knowledge and common sense that allow `everyone' to make inferences about the thief are not explicitly stated, knowledge clearly plays a role in the group's reasoning process. In international relations, coercive behaviour follows a similar logic. For instance, weak nations often yield to their stronger counterparts even when these dominant states do not resort to force. This situation is fundamentally different from one in which a weaker state is forced to bend to the will of its rival. In the former scenario, the weaker state still has the choice of whether or not to comply (even though the potential alternative is extremely undesirable). Coercive behaviour, therefore, is made possible by virtue of the weaker party's knowledge and expectations. As in the example of the thief, however, the role of knowledge and expectations is often overlooked. This is because the unequal strength of rivals plays such a decisive role in the latter example of coercive behaviour that the submissive behaviour of states under coercion is generally attributed to strictly material factors.

In cognitive material explanations, the actor's choice of mode of behaviour is rationally instrumental as regards the logic of expected consequences. The actors' preferences being constant, the main issue is that of choice of mode, while it is variances in an actor's perceived knowledge of the outside world that influence its evaluation of the cost and benefits of different modes of behaviour.

This type of explanation is based on the following form of cognition: Not that an actor's interests are completely material, certain of them are built on ideas, which lead its behaviour and constitute an independent variable when explaining behaviour. This kind of explanation involves changes in the actor's preferences and sense of identity and values. A change in the actor's interests causes a corresponding change in its behaviour that cannot be explained by purely material factors. Ideas involve desires and knowledge; purely ideational explanations focus on the influence of a change in the actor's `desires' (or aspirations) on state behaviour. Within such an explanation, it is the logic of appropriateness, and not rational logic that is inferred as instrumental in the effect. Academic use of conceptual explanations is illustrated in the following example. In his analysis of the post-World War II decolonization movement, Robert Jackson argues that the decolonization drive was a fundamentally normative struggle. Decolonization was neither the result of a shift in power dynamics nor of a change in fundamental imperialist economic interests; it was driven by a change in the common perception of legitimacy. Decolonization was more a revolution of ideas regarding international statecraft and whether or not it could be considered legitimate rather than of power. Jackson observes that proponents of decolonization were supported in their demands for independence by prevailing norms and ideals. Nationalists knew that within this atmosphere of democratization, their opponents would be hard put to refute their arguments. Although Jackson does not completely deny the role that power and interests played in decolonization, he nevertheless regards the evolution of ideals as the driving force behind the movement. Jackson's conceptual explanation of decolonization uses change in worldview as its independent variable. More specifically, he focuses on how an actor's values and sense of legitimacy are able to influence its behavior.

In a broad sense, the notion of `ideas' encompasses preferences, desires, knowledge, and information. State behaviour being the product of conscious decision-making, all behavior may be said to have passed through the medium of `ideas'. Yet, if any explanation that touches upon `ideas' is to be regarded as ideational, then virtually all explanations could be so categorized. Similarly, material explanations in which all relevant factors are viewed as material would also regard the human brain as material, thereby cancelling out any possible ideational explanation. Ideas constitute an extremely broad concept, and if no limitations are imposed on the scope of ideational explanations, they can be applied in almost every case, which reduces their significance. This is not to say that all explanations incorporating relevant ideational elements are ideational; or that all analyses that touch upon material elements are material. What relevant is the underlying mechanism of cause and effect that leads actors to make behavioural choices. A consideration that clearly distinguishes material interests, informational factors and a sense of values, therefore, is of benefit.

On the basis of the above considerations, this essay holds that when changes in ideas are raised as the possible cause of changes in behaviour, exactly the change that the actor's sense of identity and of appropriate behaviour has undergone must be defined; an ideational explanation, therefore, does not account for the influence changes in the actor's information have on changed behaviour. Moreover, neither can the use of ideas as a device for pursuing material interests be viewed as an ideational explanation.

The manner in which human rights issues are treated in American foreign policy illustrates this point. While protecting human rights is itself in the interests of the United States, it is also an issue that is pursued in order to achieve other objectives. If the United States' decision to respect human rights were to lead to changes in American foreign policy, this change in behaviour would certainly merit an ideational explanation. The aim of the above distinction is to avoid an ideational explanation for almost all of state behaviour, in particular that which exhibits initiative. As John Hall once said, `Ideas are not held to be determinant in some free-floating way', and if research `is based on the acknowledgment that social actors have both ideal and material interests, it has much to recommend it'.

This distinction is helpful as regards a deeper cognizance of the opposing affects of the respective influences of ideational and material factors on behaviour, and of the absence of information from the equation.

It is worth pointing out that this essay in no way refutes that ideas play as significant a role in any determination of behaviour as material factors. As conscious behaviour goes through mental processes, the actor's framework of cognition is bound to influence its behaviour. This makes an abstract weighing-up of the contrasting influences of the ideational and the material extremely difficult. Explanations based on information and cognition of material factors, no matter how various, take a fundamentally different approach from those based on the actor's ideas. In order to give a succinct explanation of changes in behaviour it is important to separate these two analytical approaches. The focus of the foregoing three explanations is on the motivation for changes in Qing Dynasty diplomatic behaviour. It asks, did material factors, in particular cognition of material information, or a change in the sense of values and concepts of appropriate behaviour play the more dominant role in changed behaviour. Bearing in mind the distinctions made in this essay, from a cause and effect perspective, it was the Qing Dynasty's gradual cognisance of the shift in balance of power between China and the West (albeit it sluggishly and with only a clouded perception of its full significance) that caused the change in its diplomatic behaviour. This essay does not regard such a change as ideational. Even from the point of view of the most materially motivated actor, owing to the information factor, non-cognition of information was not instrumental in the change in Qing diplomatic behaviour.

This raises the question of how can one evaluate the effectiveness of ideational and material explanations. To this end, we offer a rough guideline: In effective material analyses, there must be a plausible explanation for behavioural adjustments without resorting to changes in concepts of legitimacy. From the ideational standpoint, the change in behaviour resulted from a specific change in ideas, and can be traced to it.

Having made these distinctions, it must be borne in mind that they are operational guidelines only, and not intended to constitute full, appropriate conditions for a firm ideational or material explanation.

Qing dynasty foreign policy was chosen as the subject for this analysis for several reasons. First, the dynasty's reign encompassed a prolonged period of stability that culminated in significant change. The length of the Qing reign, however, does not compromise the effectiveness of variables that occurred within it. This would be the case if the essay were to choose a period in whose extent the actor underwent a fundamental change in identity. In, for example, an analysis of China throughout the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing periods, the differing value systems of these successive dynasties would undoubtedly have significant impact on the foreign policy behaviour of the actor in question. Specific selection of the Qing dynasty allows for the study of cultural and normative differences between China and the West in a number of different contexts. Initially, cross-cultural contact was extremely rare, but by the end of the dynasty it had become quite commonplace. An analysis of this period of history may determine whether changes in Qing foreign policy were brought about by transformation of the Qing value system, changes in material factors or cognition of material factors. This case examines a period of history long enough to cover the related concept of essential change in identity.

Prior to the mid 19th century, China's diplomatic practice was almost exclusively confined to the tribute system. Imperial China's vast, independent territory also had considerable influence on its dealings with the West. The Chinese people regarded the Emperor as the ruler of `all under heaven'; no other monarch in their perceived view of the world shared his near god-like status. Diplomatic exchanges were not regarded as a necessary aspect of the Emperor's activities. China's smaller, neighbouring states, however, believed that they had much to gain by establishing ties with their large, powerful neighbour. They pursued relationships with this dominant power within their midst with political, economic, and cultural interests in mind. The tribute system, therefore, existed on the basis of disparity of power and interests.

The substance of the tribute system was initially nebulous; it took hundreds of years for this institution to develop into its full formality. It originated in the archaic system of tributes paid to the Emperor by vassal states during the chaotic pre-Qin period and reached its zenith during the Ming Dynasty. Institutionalization of this system increased its complexity. The Ming and Qing dynasties imposed rigorous regulations regarding the appointed time, personnel, and itinerary of foreign countries wishing to pay tribute. Abiding by the host of conditions stipulated by the court regarding tribute protocol was crucial. Visiting foreign dignitaries were expected to spend the time necessary on versing themselves in the relevant ceremonials before they were allowed to go about their business.

The tribute system in force during Ming and Qing dynasties was imbued with pre-Qin ceremonial and symbolic significance. A certain number of tributary states, however, played only a symbolically subordinate role in the tribute giving ritual. Chinese rule was nominal rather than actual. The governance of old imperial China adhered to the principle of national unity, in which feudal rulers formed relationships with foreign officials within the framework of the tribute system. The parties concerned enacted the roles of the highly respected, high ranking Chinese superior and lowly, deferential foreign subordinate, a relationship reflected in tribute documents as well as ceremony. The system actually worked to maintain relations with, rather than subjugate, neighbouring countries. It was also one of material benefit to tributary states, as they were often rewarded with gifts more valuable than those they had originally offered in tribute.

Enforcement of a foreign sector

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Upon overthrowing the Ming dynasty, the incoming Qing rulers inherited its system of tribute. The Qing court was punctilious about the rules attached to paying tribute. In common with its predecessors, the new government imposed specific regulations as to when and how foreign nations were permitted to pay tribute to the imperial court. In 1637, for example, the Qing government ruled, `It is agreed that Korea may pay tribute once annually in addition to at the Holy and Pure Festival, New Year and the Winter Solstice.' This rule remained in force until the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1840. Another instance occurred in 1829, when Vietnam moved its capital to Fuchun. The new capital was even more distant from Zhennanguan, the prescribed point of entry by inland water route from which the Vietnamese made their way to Peking. Vietnamese officials requested permission to travel by an alternative, maritime route from southern Canton. The emperor refused, on the grounds that it would violate convention. The rules applying to the number of foreign delegations coming to Peking by ship or road to give tribute were more or less the same as those of the preceding Ming Dynasty. In 1652, the Qing Dynasty ruled that, `Representatives of all countries coming by land to pay tribute must not exceed 100. Twenty may enter the capital while the remainder stays on the outskirts and waits for their largess; those arriving by a maritime route must travel in no more than three ships and not exceed 100 person per ship. The remainder is not permitted to disembark'. Another edict issued by the Qing government in 1644 states, `Countries may pay tribute depending on their official documents and local produce'. Tribute documents were based on Qin Dynasty memorials from vassal states entering the suzerain. They exemplified the underlying principal-subordinate relationship of the tribute system, their language based on imperial edicts and tribute ceremonials. China's rulers, however, had a clear and pragmatic approach to the tribute system. They were aware that the main objective of many tributary expeditions, superficial protestations of loyalty and obedient kowtows notwithstanding, was to carry on trade. The grandiose and chauvinistic language espoused by the Qing court, therefore, was largely symbolic. China's illusion of its superiority over its neighbours did not stem from a desire for global dominance. In reality, Qing leaders were content to seal themselves off from the outside world, having little interest in forging relationships with other nations.

Prior to the 19th century, China and the West conducted their international affairs on the basis of completely different norms. The setting of respective permanent missions in Italian city-states and their vassals, other than at times of war, became conventional practice in the early 15th century. The Italian practice gradually made its way to other European nations. By the end of the 16th century, the phenomenon whereby serious diplomatic relationships between monarchs, put in place during peacetime and maintained in the midst of European power struggles by means of reciprocally assigned permanent foreign envoys, had become relatively common. By the latter half of the 17th century, the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions among Western nations and their counterparts was also commonplace.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia marked the formation of a set of Western norms that would shape the international system. In time, the canon of conventions governing international relations became increasingly complex. The 1815 Congress of Vienna, for example, sought to standardize norms applying to diplomacy and commerce and also to codify court protocol. The standard Western etiquette for greeting a foreign head of state stated that visiting emissaries should, upon presenting themselves to the monarch, bow three times before directly presenting diplomatic credentials. After a brief conversation, the emissary repeated the initial ritual before making his exit with a full bow, rather than getting down on one knee.²¹ These details are important by virtue of their complete contrast to Chinese protocol. The voyages of discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries that increased interaction between China and the West led inevitably to conflicting perceptions of the rituals appropriate to diplomatic protocol.

The Qing dynasty forbade maritime intercourse with foreign countries shortly after it was founded, much to the dismay of ambitious European traders. Eager to surpass their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch decided to join the tribute system as a means to gaining access to Chinese markets. Holland, according to tributary state protocol, was assigned a set time frame and itinerary for offering tribute.

In 1653, the governor of Dutch Batavia dispatched a special envoy to Canton (Guangdong province) where he made the request to pay tribute and at the same time trade. The envoy, however, had not brought with him the requisite tribute documents or gifts and was refused. The Dutch official immediately expressed willingness to respect China's customs, and suggested that he would despatch members of his retinue back to Batavia to obtain the necessary documents and gifts and awaited their return in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, so that he can travel to Peking to offer tribute when the necessary preparations had been made. But this request was denied by Peking.

Two years later, the Batavian governor again dispatched a special envoy. On this occasion extra care had been taken to ensure that the required materials were prepared. The envoy then requested, and was granted, the Qing court's permission to enter the capital. During his time in Peking, the Dutch envoy adhered strictly to all ceremonial rituals required of him, to the extent of executing the full kowtow before the Emperor. All of this, as may be inferred, was motivated by Dutch desire to establish trade relations with China. The court's response to the Dutch tribute and request to trade was one of `sympathy and understanding for the people from a distant land', and to extend the tribute period (to eight years) on condition that, `the tribute delegation does not exceed 100 members, 20 of whom may enter the capital; all produce carried must be handed over to the Embassy. There must be no unauthorised selling of merchandise on the East China Sea'. This actually restricted the scope of tributes received by the Qing court which, moreover, refused all requests to engage in direct trade.

The ban on maritime trade and intercourse with foreign countries was lifted after Taiwan came under Qing Dynasty control. Thus the Dutch were able to enter Guangdong and Fujian to trade with China. As, the Dutch sent no more envoys to pay tribute to the Qing court over the succeeding 100 years, their tribute period was curtailed, thereby rendering the regulations pertaining to Dutch tributes nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper.

The Dutch approach to courting the Qing contrasted with that of other Western diplomatic missions in that it unquestioningly followed the dynasty's established ceremonial protocol. The Dutch obviously expected that abiding by Chinese formalities would advance their trading interests. Moreover, they dared not risk losing favour with the Chinese government merely through a breach of court decorum. The Qing court, on the other hand, regarded Western nations merely as tributary states to whom occasional conciliatory gestures must be made to keep them under control, the selected method of mollification being that of trade. Governmental relations between China and the West were of a loose, nominal nature. Sentiments expressed regarding common protection were in cognizance of China's superior national power, particularly during the flourishing Qing reign. Upon first arriving in China, the Portuguese and Dutch had no illusions about their ability to contend with this huge nation's superior might, an assumption that inhibited them from any attempt at establishing diplomatic relations on a modern, equal footing.

Although the Dutch tribute protocol compromise was not entirely in vain, it nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect, a reality that was not lost on other European countries. The discovery that adherence to Chinese tribute rituals was insufficient to satisfy Western trading ambitions lessened the likelihood of Western deference to the system's ceremony and rituals. Their reasons, on the one hand, were that such concessions would not achieve their desired interests. On the other, as their power grew stronger, the benefits of compromise correspondingly shrank.

The establishment of Sino-Russian relations in the early 17th century occurred at a crucial point in China's early interactions with the West. The Russians' first contacts with China marked a change in Qing diplomatic policy, whereby rulers played down their grandiose self-image and liberalised their foreign policy. Despite these conciliatory gestures, however, early Sino-Russian relations were plagued with intense disputes over diplomatic protocol.

Shortly after the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Russian government dispatched diplomatic envoys to China to explore trading possibilities. In February 1654, the Russians sent Feodor Baikoff and his mission to China. The Russian Czar gave Baikoff detailed instructions as to protocol, stressing that the letter of credence and gifts should be personally handed to the Emperor. He was also emphatic that the Qing Emperor writes the Czar's full name and title on the diplomatic credentials he presented to Baikoff. If there was any variance on this point, the documents were not to be brought back to Russia. The envoy was forbidden to bow to the imperial palace or to kiss the Emperor's feet, although he was permitted to kiss the Emperor's hand. The Russians were evidently ill informed about Chinese diplomatic protocol.

At this time, the Qing Court was equally unconversant with Russian affairs. It was unaware, for example, that the Cossack invasion of northeast China had actually been Russian. In view of this historical misapprehension, the Qing court assumed that Baikoff's mission to Peking as one based on admiration of China's culture or economic prosperity.

Upon arrival of Baikoff's diplomatic mission in Beijing in March 1656, Qing officials requested that, in accordance with standard protocol, the visiting envoys hand gifts and diplomatic credentials over to them, that they may in turn convey them to the Emperor. But the Russian Czar had specifically instructed Baikoff to deliver the documents and gifts personally. This put him in the predicament of being unable to satisfy one set of protocol without breaching the other. After extensive negotiations, Baikoff was compelled to deliver the gifts that the Czar had exhorted him to present directly to his Chinese counterpart to Qing officials. Shortly after, the Qing court demanded that Baikoff also hand over his credentials. On the basis of his original instructions from the Czar, Baikoff refused. After over four months of deadlock, the Qing court eventually elected to compromise and allowed Baikoff personally to present his credentials to the Emperor.

Much of the wrangling between the Russians and Chinese lacked substantive content. As neither side knew very much about the other, each entered into negotiations with a host of unrealistic expectations. While Baikoff's mission and those later lead by Russian envoys Ivan Perfilyev and Abolin were largely unsuccessful, they substantially increased the two sides' understanding of one another. Later Russian emissaries clearly benefited from the work of these early diplomatic pioneers.

The lack of understanding between the two nations did not change until after a military dispute during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi. The most intense conflict over protocol in the early days of Sino-Russian relations was triggered by Nicholas Spafari's mission to China. Emperor Kangxi had already sent two letters to the Czar before Spafari's visit in an effort to resolve the conflict at the Heilongjiang river basin as well as the matter of Tahur chief Gantimur's defection to Russia. This made clear the Qing Dynasty's awareness of its need for flexibility and compromise in diplomatic protocol if it were to reach agreement with Russia on major issues. Soon after Spafari arrived in Beijing, he found that his instructions as to how to present his diplomatic credentials conflicted with Chinese protocol. According to Qing protocol, after each country's tribute had crossed the border its credentials and gifts were to be examined by the official of the relevant locality. Before crossing the Nen river, the protocol official Ma La that received Spafari demanded, according to official protocol, that he hand over his credentials in order that they may be checked for `discourteous wording', also the gifts that they may be scrutinized. This request was flatly refused. Spafari insisted on delivering the documents personally to the Emperor.

During the time the Russian envoy spent in the capital there seemed to be no end of dispute over the respective protocol. In the normal course of events, upon arrival in the capital the foreign envoy would hand over the credence letters and gifts to be presented to the relevant government office for respective translation and checking. The documents would then be submitted to the Qing emperor and the gifts to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On this occasion the Qing court altered conventional protocol by allowing Spafari to place his letter of credence on top of a yellow damask seal case. This and the gifts were then presented to a Grand Secretariats (Great Academicians of the Inner Hall) acting as Emperor Kangxi's representative. Another difference of opinion as to protocol was that of whether or not the Russian visitors should kowtow or, as the Russian Czar had insisted, merely bow to the emperor. As Qing officials were obdurate on this point of etiquette, the Russian emissaries had to decide between compromise or failure to complete their mission; they ultimately opted for the former option.

Problems as to the format and style of diplomatic documents further complicated relations. Qing court conventions in this regard were based on imperial edicts issued to vassal states. Letters of credence submitted by vassal states paying tribute were in complete contrast to conventional Western diplomatic intercourse, which were conducted on the basis of equality of both parties. The Russian envoy to China's mandate was that the Czar's complete name and title be written on the Qing Court letter of credence, thereby upholding the Russian ruler's dignity. If the Chinese refused to comply, the document would not be taken back to Russia. Before Spafari returned to Russia, he demanded a copy of the Qing reciprocal letter of credence in Latin, on the grounds of ensuring that it showed his full title and contained no inappropriate wording that might in any way `damage the Czar's dignity'. It was by the similar consideration that the Qing court demanded that Spafari submit the Czar's letter of credence to them in order that Qing officials could translate it and ensure that it did not contain any wording that might be considered disrespectful to the emperor. Spafari refused and Qing officials sternly rebutted. As both sides appeared to have reached a stalemate on this issue, the Qing court took the view that `talks between the two rulers have reached a conclusion', and asked Spafari to leave Beijing for Russia as soon as possible without the reciprocal letter of credence.

By refusing to issue diplomatic credentials to Spafari, the Chinese were able to avoid further dispute. Scholar Li Yunquan points out that in taking this decision, the Qing court nominally maintained the established system of protocol. In reality, however, it had given considerable thought to whether or not the Russians would accept the high-handed, condescending tone in which the Qing letter of credence had been written. It was at this point that it began to occur to Qing officials that official documents other than imperial edicts should be written in less high-blown language. This posits the suggestion that China's knowledge of the outside world had evolved, moreover that in order to protect China's interests the court had to be prepared to compromise when dealing with more powerful counterparts.

In 1689, as both sides engaged in negotiations over the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Russian representative Feodor Golovin requested, in accordance with his mandate, that in credence letters the Qing Emperor be referred to by the same title as the Czar, rather than as `the ruler of all under heaven' in the manner of imperial edicts. Furthermore, the Russians demanded that credentials be delivered according to the Western convention where visiting envoys submitted them directly to the sovereign. The Qing court representative's response was a refusal on both counts by saying that they are unauthorized on them.