Economy of Qing Empire

The diplomatic credentials that the Izrailov mission, whose main aim was to increase Russia's trade with China, included all of the Emperor's titles, but referred to him as his `majesty' rather then his `highness'. The Russian letter of credence proceeded on considerations of neighbourliness and of maintaining security on their common borders; Emperor Kangxi also broke with convention by personal receiving the document. The Emperor may have accepted the documents, but the Qing court steadfastly refused issue a response. The dispute persisted until 1725, when the Chinese Ministry of Minority affairs and the Russian Privy Council finally worked out a compromise.

The Qing government showed considerable flexibility in its handling of protocol disputes with the Russians. Although reluctant to yield ground on their concept of diplomatic etiquette, the Chinese compromises reveal that the desire to pursue material interests outweighed ideational interests. The flexibility that the Qing showed in dealing with the Russians did not stem from a change in preferences, values or self-interest; it was a change in material factors that prompted their behavioural adjustments.

McCartney Goes to China

In 1792, England assigned former diplomat and colonial governor George McCartney as head of a delegation to China, ostensibly to celebrate Emperor Qianlong's 83rd birthday. There was considerable confusion as to the real motivation for the visit. The English intended to conduct diplomatic discussions on an equal footing, while the Chinese assumed that the mission was a tribute pilgrimage. When McCartney arrived in Tianjin in August 1793, Emperor Qianlong elected to follow the precedent set by Emperor Kangxi of not insisting on the English following Qing diplomatic protocol to the letter. During the time the mission spent in Tianjin, no disputes over protocol arose. When, however, Emperor Qianlong received the list of gifts the English offered in Chengde, he was incensed at McCartney's title in the Chinese version being translated as `imperial envoy'. He immediately issued an edict demanding that the title be changed to that of `bearer of tribute', or `payer of respect'. The English made no objections. When Qing officials tactfully notified the English delegation that they should rehearse themselves with the kowtow, McCartney expressed no overt disagreement.

McCartney's way of dealing with the issue was, however, perfunctory. Upon presenting himself before the monarch, he simply refused to perform the required ritual of kneeling three times and touching the floor with his forehead. At Chengde, where the ceremony was to be held, the Qing Court and the McCartney mission wrangled over the protocol involved in greeting the emperor. Emperor Qianlong was furious. On the second day, the Emperor issued an edict to Qing officials in Peking reiterating that protocol be applied to foreign payers of tribute, and to decrease the standard of reception of the England mission. The Qingshigao (Draft History of the Qing Dynasty) mentions protocol flexibility in relation to the English mission's presenting of itself to the emperor: `The Emperor issued an edict to the minister of protocol indicating that the protocol followed by the English ambassador McCartney when presenting himself to the monarch should be that followed by foreign dignitaries meeting the English sovereign.' The Emperor Qianlong thus compromised over protocol, but not because of a change in his preferences, which the brevity of McCartney's stay precludes. It is clear from the Emperor Qianglong's attitude that this compromise was made under extremely undesirable circumstances.³⁷ The Qing obviously did not regard the mode of protocol in question as appropriate, but allowed it as a superficially friendly makeshift through the medium of the Qing tribute system.

From the point of view of material interests, the Qing Dynasty method was rational. Bearing in mind the Qing's lack of understanding of the West, it was unaware of any shift in the balance of power between China and the West. From the Qing court perspective, established protocol practices could be preserved. McCartney's dispute over protocol was to them a repeat performance of similar objections by the earlier Russian missions. If these foreigners were not prepared to abide by the established Chinese practices, the worst that could happen would be the court's breaking off of their tributary relations. The Qing court's having established the precedent of protocol flexibility, however, meant that it would not curtail further diplomatic dealings with the English. The court's decision to compromise over the protocol for McCartney's presenting himself to the emperor was undoubtedly influenced by England's show of might, evident in its impressive gifts, including astrological equipment, cannon, model warships, clocks, telescopes, and in the McCartney mission's arriving in England's most formidable warship. The shift in power (not to mention technological) balance was beginning to be apparent.

The protocol for foreign envoys presenting themselves to the emperor, particularly the dispute over whether or not they should kowtow, continued to be a thorn in the Qing government's side. It was not until the mid-19th century that Qing rulers were aware that it was customary for Western diplomats to hand their diplomatic credentials directly to the ruler they addressed. This practice had been long established in Europe, having been codified at the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

In September 1860, English and French forces reached Tongzhou on the outskirts of Beijing and presented the Chinese with a list of demands. Cognizant that he was negotiating from a position of weakness, Emperor Xianfeng sanctioned all on the understanding that letters of credence would not `personally handed to the emperor', as this presented `ten thousand difficulties', to the extent that he would not hesitate to draw swords over the issue. In 1867, the Qing court held special discussions on the matter of greeting the emperor. Although Yi Xin, head of the foreign ministry who was among the first to have experience in international affairs, did not specifically raise the matter of adapting to Western protocol in greeting the emperor, he did indicate a change in attitude. Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and other officials advocating Westernization (yangwu pai) advocated giving up conventional tribute protocol, but were equivocal when it came to adopting any other ceremony. Zuo Zongtang, the governor general of Shaanxi and Gansu, clearly advocated Western protocol, but there were still many officials that held strongly to the ritual of kowtowing.

As neither side would compromise over its respective protocol, negotiations among the countries reached stalemate in 1868. In the meeting the foreign ministry held with the other nations involved, it refused English, French, American, Russian, or German foreign envoys' request to greet China's ruler. The reason given was that the Emperor had yet to come of age and that it would be inappropriate for the Empress Dowager to greet visiting foreign dignitaries. The matter consequently dragged on until Emperor Tongzhi's 18th birthday in February 1873, when the ostensible reason for refusing access to the Emperor expired. At this point, the Qing court's internal debate over protocol rekindled. On 24 April, Emperor Tongzhi ordered Li Hongzhang, minister in charge of the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong, to devise a plan that would, `remove obstacles regarding Qing court protocol and that of the foreign nations'. On 1 May, Li Hongzhang presented a memorial to the Emperor in which he spoke of `the change of thousands of years', that Qing Court protocol should, `change with the times', and `Western countries should not be treated as tributary states'. If China refused to compromise, the Western powers might use this as an excuse for instigating further aggression. Li knew that if hostilities were to break out, China would be the one to suffer. Compromise seemed to be the only choice for the Chinese. On 29 July 1873, the English, French, Russian, American, Dutch and Japanese envoys had an audience with the Emperor in accordance with Western diplomatic protocol. The dispute had finally been resolved.

Material interests appear to have been the deciding factor in the debate within the Qing government body politic as to adoption of Western protocol. At the time the Emperor went to Chengde, the three kowtows were an unquestioned aspect of tribute protocol. There had obviously been no change in values on that score. The expression in Li Hongzhang's memorial `The Change of thousands of years' expresses the magnitude of change in this Qing official's perception of the outside world. It was based on cognition of the contrasts between China and the international set up, particularly as regards respective strength. Li's insistence that protocol should `move with the times' implied his belief that ideas should adapt to material realities. The recommendations in Li Hongzhang's memorial are clearly based on material interests. He feared that abiding by age-old rituals could create immense material loss. The dragging on of the dispute over protocol, however, expresses the fundamental antipathy of Qing officials towards Western protocol. Ideas, in this instance, impeded rather than promoted change. The change in protocol, therefore, was in no way attributable to a change in the Qing rulers' ideas.

The Qing Dynasty had actually made adjustments to protocol relating to foreign dignitaries, the main example that of allowing the Russian Izrailov to hand credence letters directly to Emperor Kangxi. This clearly demonstrates that if circumstances and interests had demanded, the Qing rulers would have considered a revolution in protocol much earlier. The fact that compromises initially applied to Russia, Britain, and other western great powers is very meaningful.

IV. Economical crisis (1909-1913)

At the end of the Ming dynasty, just before the Manchus overthrew the Ming and established the Qing dynasty, China's economy was in a period of expansion. New markets were being founded, and merchants were extending their businesses across provincial lines and even into the South China Sea. Chinese merchants were already active in Southeast Asia during this time, and, in fact, one of the arguments then made regarding the cessation of China's state-sponsored maritime expeditions to various places in the southern seas (such as the famed "Ming Voyages") was that these expeditions were no longer necessary. Chinese merchants themselves were going out to the South China Sea and were trading with these areas themselves, so there was no longer a need to have a tributary relationship with other states or city-states in this area. In certain instances the Qing state did balk at the movement of people into overseas commerce and tried to limit rice and metallic currency from moving out of the country, but the state simply did not have the capacity to stop trade completely. The circulation of goods went on with or without state approval. The economic growth so evident under the Ming dynasty continued under the Qing dynasty, up until the time of the Opium War in the 1840s. During this time China's domestic economy was a dynamic, commercializing economy, and in some small ways, even an industrializing economy. The Stereotype of an "Anti-Merchant" Qing State A common stereotype about late imperial China -- one that is actually perpetuated in the study of practically every period in Chinese history -- is that the Chinese government was anti-merchant. Common reasons given to support this assertion are: that Confucianism was anti-business and anti-merchant; that Confucian scholar-officials were at the top ranks of Chinese society; that state policy impaired economic activity by not supporting it in any constructive way; and that taxes were so heavy that they squeezed the life out of merchants and their businesses. But all these things are untrue.

The Qin dynasty, after unifying the territory later known as "China", took some contradictory measures to enhance the economical productivity of the empire. On the one side, money and weights and measures were standardized throughout all commanderies, leading to smoother transactions over longer distances. On the other side, the First Emperor and his successors ordered gigantic construction work in the Capital Xianyang and its surroundings as well as in other parts of the empire. The tomb of the First Emperor, the Epang Palace and the Great Wall are the most famous examples. Higher taxes and intensive corvee labour required from the peasants prevented the "national economy" from reposing after decades if not centuries of permanent warfare.

The economic policy of the Qin was compared by the early Han period writer Jia Yi with that of a wartime economy kept running even in peacetime. The exploitation of the peasantry finally lead to uprisings that would bring the downfall of the dynasty. The economic history of China stretches over thousands of years and has undergone alternating cycles of prosperity and decline. According to the book 'China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st century', China was for a large part of the last two millennia the world's largest economy, even though its wealth remained average. China's history is usually divided into three periods: The pre-imperial era, consisting of the era of before the unification of Qin, the early imperial era from Qin to Song, and the late imperial era, marked by the economic revolution that occurred during the Song Dynasty.

By roughly 10,000 BCE, in the Neolithic Era, agriculture was practiced in China. Stratified bronze-age cultures, such asErlitou, emerged by the third millennium BCE. Under the Shang (c. 1600-1045 BCE) and Zhou (1045-771 BCE), a dependent labor force worked in large-scale foundries and workshops to produce bronzes and silk for the elite. The agricultural surpluses produced by the manorial economy supported these early handicraft industries as well as urban centers and considerable armies. This system began to disintegrate after the collapse of the Western Zhou Dynasty in 771 BCE, preceding the Spring and Autumn and Warring states eras.

As the feudal system collapsed, much legislative power was transferred from the nobility to local kings. A merchant class emerged during the Warring States Period, resulting in increased trade. The new kings established an elaborate bureaucracy, using it to wage wars, build large temples, and perform public works projects. This new system rewarded talent over birthright; important positions were no longer occupied solely by nobility. The adoption of new iron tools revolutionized agriculture and led to a large population increase during this period. By 221 BCE, the state of Qin, which embraced reform more than other states, unified China, built the Great Wall, and set consistent standards of government. Although its draconian laws led to its overthrow in 206 BCE, the Qin institutions survived. During the Han Dynasty, China became a strong, unified, and centralized empire of self-sufficient farmers and artisans, though limited local autonomy remained. The Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE) brought additional economic reforms.

Paper money, the compass, and other technological advances facilitated communication on a large scale and the widespread circulation of books. The state's control of the economy diminished, allowing private merchants to prosper and a large increase in investment and profit. Despite disruptions during the Mongol conquest of 1279, the population much increased under the Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, but its GDP per capita remained static since then. In the later Qing period, China's economic development began to slow and Europe's rapid development since the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance enabled it to surpass China - an event known as the Great Divergence.

empire economy opium crisis

Conclusion

Upon overthrowing the Ming dynasty, the incoming Qing rulers inherited its system of tribute. The Qing court was punctilious about the rules attached to paying tribute. In common with its predecessors, the new government imposed specific regulations as to when and how foreign nations were permitted to pay tribute to the imperial court. In 1637, for example, the Qing government ruled, `It is agreed that Korea may pay tribute once annually in addition to at the Holy and Pure Festival, New Year and the Winter Solstice.' This rule remained in force until the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1840. Another instance occurred in 1829, when Vietnam moved its capital to Fuchun. The new capital was even more distant from Zhennanguan, the prescribed point of entry by inland water route from which the Vietnamese made their way to Peking. Vietnamese officials requested permission to travel by an alternative, maritime route from southern Canton. The emperor refused, on the grounds that it would violate convention. The rules applying to the number of foreign delegations coming to Peking by ship or road to give tribute were more or less the same as those of the preceding Ming Dynasty. In 1652, the Qing Dynasty ruled that, `Representatives of all countries coming by land to pay tribute must not exceed 100. Twenty may enter the capital while the remainder stays on the outskirts and waits for their largess; those arriving by a maritime route must travel in no more than three ships and not exceed 100 person per ship. The remainder is not permitted to disembark'. Another edict issued by the Qing government in 1644 states, `Countries may pay tribute depending on their official documents and local produce'. Tribute documents were based on Qin Dynasty memorials from vassal states entering the suzerain. They exemplified the underlying principal-subordinate relationship of the tribute system, their language based on imperial edicts and tribute ceremonials. China's rulers, however, had a clear and pragmatic approach to the tribute system. They were aware that the main objective of many tributary expeditions, superficial protestations of loyalty and obedient kowtows notwithstanding, was to carry on trade. The grandiose and chauvinistic language espoused by the Qing court, therefore, was largely symbolic. China's illusion of its superiority over its neighbours did not stem from a desire for global dominance. In reality, Qing leaders were content to seal themselves off from the outside world, having little interest in forging relationships with other nations.

Prior to the 19th century, China and the West conducted their international affairs on the basis of completely different norms. The setting of respective permanent missions in Italian city-states and their vassals, other than at times of war, became conventional practice in the early 15th century. The Italian practice gradually made its way to other European nations. By the end of the 16th century, the phenomenon whereby serious diplomatic relationships between monarchs, put in place during peacetime and maintained in the midst of European power struggles by means of reciprocally assigned permanent foreign envoys, had become relatively common. By the latter half of the 17th century, the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions among Western nations and their counterparts was also commonplace.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia marked the formation of a set of Western norms that would shape the international system. In time, the canon of conventions governing international relations became increasingly complex. The 1815 Congress of Vienna, for example, sought to standardize norms applying to diplomacy and commerce and also to codify court protocol. The standard Western etiquette for greeting a foreign head of state stated that visiting emissaries should, upon presenting themselves to the monarch, bow three times before directly presenting diplomatic credentials. After a brief conversation, the emissary repeated the initial ritual before making his exit with a full bow, rather than getting down on one knee.²¹ These details are important by virtue of their complete contrast to Chinese protocol. The voyages of discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries that increased interaction between China and the West led inevitably to conflicting perceptions of the rituals appropriate to diplomatic protocol.

The Qing dynasty forbade maritime intercourse with foreign countries shortly after it was founded, much to the dismay of ambitious European traders. Eager to surpass their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch decided to join the tribute system as a means to gaining access to Chinese markets. Holland, according to tributary state protocol, was assigned a set time frame and itinerary for offering tribute.

In 1653, the governor of Dutch Batavia dispatched a special envoy to Canton (Guangdong province) where he made the request to pay tribute and at the same time trade. The envoy, however, had not brought with him the requisite tribute documents or gifts and was refused. The Dutch official immediately expressed willingness to respect China's customs, and suggested that he would despatch members of his retinue back to Batavia to obtain the necessary documents and gifts and awaited their return in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, so that he can travel to Peking to offer tribute when the necessary preparations had been made. But this request was denied by Peking.

Two years later, the Batavian governor again dispatched a special envoy. On this occasion extra care had been taken to ensure that the required materials were prepared. The envoy then requested, and was granted, the Qing court's permission to enter the capital. During his time in Peking, the Dutch envoy adhered strictly to all ceremonial rituals required of him, to the extent of executing the full kowtow before the Emperor. All of this, as may be inferred, was motivated by Dutch desire to establish trade relations with China. The court's response to the Dutch tribute and request to trade was one of `sympathy and understanding for the people from a distant land', and to extend the tribute period (to eight years) on condition that, `the tribute delegation does not exceed 100 members, 20 of whom may enter the capital; all produce carried must be handed over to the Embassy. There must be no unauthorised selling of merchandise on the East China Sea'. This actually restricted the scope of tributes received by the Qing court which, moreover, refused all requests to engage in direct trade.

The ban on maritime trade and intercourse with foreign countries was lifted after Taiwan came under Qing Dynasty control. Thus the Dutch were able to enter Guangdong and Fujian to trade with China. As, the Dutch sent no more envoys to pay tribute to the Qing court over the succeeding 100 years, their tribute period was curtailed, thereby rendering the regulations pertaining to Dutch tributes nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper.

The Dutch approach to courting the Qing contrasted with that of other Western diplomatic missions in that it unquestioningly followed the dynasty's established ceremonial protocol. The Dutch obviously expected that abiding by Chinese formalities would advance their trading interests. Moreover, they dared not risk losing favour with the Chinese government merely through a breach of court decorum. The Qing court, on the other hand, regarded Western nations merely as tributary states to whom occasional conciliatory gestures must be made to keep them under control, the selected method of mollification being that of trade. Governmental relations between China and the West were of a loose, nominal nature. Sentiments expressed regarding common protection were in cognizance of China's superior national power, particularly during the flourishing Qing reign. Upon first arriving in China, the Portuguese and Dutch had no illusions about their ability to contend with this huge nation's superior might, an assumption that inhibited them from any attempt at establishing diplomatic relations on a modern, equal footing.

Although the Dutch tribute protocol compromise was not entirely in vain, it nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect, a reality that was not lost on other European countries. The discovery that adherence to Chinese tribute rituals was insufficient to satisfy Western trading ambitions lessened the likelihood of Western deference to the system's ceremony and rituals. Their reasons, on the one hand, were that such concessions would not achieve their desired interests. On the other, as their power grew stronger, the benefits of compromise correspondingly shrank.

The establishment of Sino-Russian relations in the early 17th century occurred at a crucial point in China's early interactions with the West. The Russians' first contacts with China marked a change in Qing diplomatic policy, whereby rulers played down their grandiose self-image and liberalised their foreign policy. Despite these conciliatory gestures, however, early Sino-Russian relations were plagued with intense disputes over diplomatic protocol.

Shortly after the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Russian government dispatched diplomatic envoys to China to explore trading possibilities. In February 1654, the Russians sent Feodor Baikoff and his mission to China. The Russian Czar gave Baikoff detailed instructions as to protocol, stressing that the letter of credence and gifts should be personally handed to the Emperor. He was also emphatic that the Qing Emperor writes the Czar's full name and title on the diplomatic credentials he presented to Baikoff. If there was any variance on this point, the documents were not to be brought back to Russia. The envoy was forbidden to bow to the imperial palace or to kiss the Emperor's feet, although he was permitted to kiss the Emperor's hand. The Russians were evidently ill informed about Chinese diplomatic protocol.

At this time, the Qing Court was equally unconversant with Russian affairs. It was unaware, for example, that the Cossack invasion of northeast China had actually been Russian. In view of this historical misapprehension, the Qing court assumed that Baikoff's mission to Peking as one based on admiration of China's culture or economic prosperity.

Upon arrival of Baikoff's diplomatic mission in Beijing in March 1656, Qing officials requested that, in accordance with standard protocol, the visiting envoys hand gifts and diplomatic credentials over to them, that they may in turn convey them to the Emperor. But the Russian Czar had specifically instructed Baikoff to deliver the documents and gifts personally. This put him in the predicament of being unable to satisfy one set of protocol without breaching the other. After extensive negotiations, Baikoff was compelled to deliver the gifts that the Czar had exhorted him to present directly to his Chinese counterpart to Qing officials. Shortly after, the Qing court demanded that Baikoff also hand over his credentials. On the basis of his original instructions from the Czar, Baikoff refused. After over four months of deadlock, the Qing court eventually elected to compromise and allowed Baikoff personally to present his credentials to the Emperor.

Much of the wrangling between the Russians and Chinese lacked substantive content. As neither side knew very much about the other, each entered into negotiations with a host of unrealistic expectations. While Baikoff's mission and those later lead by Russian envoys Ivan Perfilyev and Abolin were largely unsuccessful, they substantially increased the two sides' understanding of one another. Later Russian emissaries clearly benefited from the work of these early diplomatic pioneers.

The lack of understanding between the two nations did not change until after a military dispute during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi. The most intense conflict over protocol in the early days of Sino-Russian relations was triggered by Nicholas Spafari's mission to China. Emperor Kangxi had already sent two letters to the Czar before Spafari's visit in an effort to resolve the conflict at the Heilongjiang river basin as well as the matter of Tahur chief Gantimur's defection to Russia. This made clear the Qing Dynasty's awareness of its need for flexibility and compromise in diplomatic protocol if it were to reach agreement with Russia on major issues. Soon after Spafari arrived in Beijing, he found that his instructions as to how to present his diplomatic credentials conflicted with Chinese protocol. According to Qing protocol, after each country's tribute had crossed the border its credentials and gifts were to be examined by the official of the relevant locality. Before crossing the Nen river, the protocol official Ma La that received Spafari demanded, according to official protocol, that he hand over his credentials in order that they may be checked for `discourteous wording', also the gifts that they may be scrutinized. This request was flatly refused. Spafari insisted on delivering the documents personally to the Emperor.

During the time the Russian envoy spent in the capital there seemed to be no end of dispute over the respective protocol. In the normal course of events, upon arrival in the capital the foreign envoy would hand over the credence letters and gifts to be presented to the relevant government office for respective translation and checking. The documents would then be submitted to the Qing emperor and the gifts to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On this occasion the Qing court altered conventional protocol by allowing Spafari to place his letter of credence on top of a yellow damask seal case. This and the gifts were then presented to a Grand Secretariats (Great Academicians of the Inner Hall) acting as Emperor Kangxi's representative. Another difference of opinion as to protocol was that of whether or not the Russian visitors should kowtow or, as the Russian Czar had insisted, merely bow to the emperor. As Qing officials were obdurate on this point of etiquette, the Russian emissaries had to decide between compromise or failure to complete their mission; they ultimately opted for the former option.

Problems as to the format and style of diplomatic documents further complicated relations. Qing court conventions in this regard were based on imperial edicts issued to vassal states. Letters of credence submitted by vassal states paying tribute were in complete contrast to conventional Western diplomatic intercourse, which were conducted on the basis of equality of both parties. The Russian envoy to China's mandate was that the Czar's complete name and title be written on the Qing Court letter of credence, thereby upholding the Russian ruler's dignity. If the Chinese refused to comply, the document would not be taken back to Russia. Before Spafari returned to Russia, he demanded a copy of the Qing reciprocal letter of credence in Latin, on the grounds of ensuring that it showed his full title and contained no inappropriate wording that might in any way `damage the Czar's dignity'. It was by the similar consideration that the Qing court demanded that Spafari submit the Czar's letter of credence to them in order that Qing officials could translate it and ensure that it did not contain any wording that might be considered disrespectful to the emperor. Spafari refused and Qing officials sternly rebutted. As both sides appeared to have reached a stalemate on this issue, the Qing court took the view that `talks between the two rulers have reached a conclusion', and asked Spafari to leave Beijing for Russia as soon as possible without the reciprocal letter of credence.

By refusing to issue diplomatic credentials to Spafari, the Chinese were able to avoid further dispute. Scholar Li Yunquan points out that in taking this decision, the Qing court nominally maintained the established system of protocol. In reality, however, it had given considerable thought to whether or not the Russians would accept the high-handed, condescending tone in which the Qing letter of credence had been written. It was at this point that it began to occur to Qing officials that official documents other than imperial edicts should be written in less high-blown language. This posits the suggestion that China's knowledge of the outside world had evolved, moreover that in order to protect China's interests the court had to be prepared to compromise when dealing with more powerful counterparts.

References

1. Chesneaux, Jean, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere. China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution. Trans. Anne Destenay. New York: Pantheon, 1976.

2. "China," Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2004 1997-2004 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

3. Samuel Wells Williams (1848). The Middle kingdom: a survey of the ... Chinese empire and its inhabitants ....(1 ed.). New York: Wiley & Putnam. p. 489.

4. Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd, 2010), pp. 220-224.

5. Bartlett, Beatrice S. Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0-520-06591-8.

6. Ebrey, Patricia. Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook (2nd edition), New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. ISBN 978-0-02-908752-7.

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