Theoretical English grammar

The essential principles of this interpretation of predication can be expressed even without the term "predication" as such. The latter approach to the exposition of the predicative meaning of the sentence can be seen, for instance, in the course of English grammar by M. A. Ganshina and N. M. Vasilevskaya, who write: "Every sentence shows the relation of the statement to reality from the point of view of the speaker" [Ganshina, Vasilevskaya, 321].

Now, it is easily noticed that the cited and similar definitions of predication do not explicitly distinguish the two cardinal sides of the sentence content, namely, the nominative side and the predicative side. We may quite plausibly suppose that the non-discrimination of these two sides of sentence meaning gave the ultimate cause to some scholars for their negative attitude towards the notion of predication as the fundamental factor of sentence forming.

Taking into consideration the two-aspective character of the sentence as a signemic unit of language, predication should now be interpreted not simply as referring the content of the sentence to reality, but as referring the nominative content of the sentence to reality. It is this interpretation of the semantic-functional nature of predication that discloses, in one and the same generalised presentation, both the unity of the two identified aspects of the sentence, and also their different, though mutually complementary meaningful roles.

CHAPTER XXII. ACTUAL DIVISION OF THE SENTENCE

The notional parts of the sentence referring to the basic elements of the reflected situation form, taken together, the nominative meaning of the sentence. For the sake of terminological consistency, the division of the sentence into notional parts can be just so called -- the "nominative division" (its existing names are the "grammatical division" and the "syntactic division"). The discrimination of the nominative division of the sentence is traditional; it is this type of division that can conveniently be shown by a syntagmatic model, in particular, by a model of immediate constituents based on the traditional syntactic analysis (see Ch. XXIV).

Alongside of the nominative division of the sentence, the idea of the so-called "actual division" of the sentence has been put forward in theoretical linguistics. The purpose of the actual division of the sentence, called also the "functional sentence perspective", is to reveal the correlative significance of the sentence parts from the point of view of their actual informative role in an utterance, i.e. from the point of view of the immediate semantic contribution they make to the total information conveyed by the sentence in the context of connected speech. In other words, the actual division of the sentence in fact exposes its informative perspective.

The main components of the actual division of the sentence are the theme and the rheme. The theme expresses the starting point of the communication, i.e. it denotes an object or a phenomenon about which something is reported. The rheme expresses the basic informative part of the communication, its contextually relevant centre. Between the theme and the rheme are positioned intermediary, transitional parts of the actual division of various degrees of informative value (these parts are sometimes called "transition").

The theme of the actual division of the sentence may or may not coincide with the subject of the sentence. The rheme of the actual division, in its turn, may or may not coincide with the predicate of the sentence -- either with the whole predicate group or its part, such as the predicative, the object, the adverbial.

Thus, in the following sentences of various emotional character the theme is expressed by the subject, while the rheme is expressed by the predicate:

Max bounded forward. Again Charlie is being too clever! Her advice can't be of any help to us.

In the first of the above sentences the rheme coincides with the whole predicate group. In the second sentence the adverbial introducer again can be characterised as a transitional element, i.e. an element informationally intermediary between the theme and the rheme, the latter being expressed by the rest of the predicate group, The main part of the rheme -- the "peak" of informative perspective --- is rendered in this sentence by the intensified predicative too clever. In the third sentence the addressee object to us is more or less transitional, while the informative peak, as in the previous example, is expressed by the predicative of any help.

In the following sentences the correlation between the nominative and actual divisions is the reverse: the theme is expressed by the predicate or its part, while the rheme is rendered by the subject:

Through the open window came the purr of an approaching motor car. Who is coming late but John! There is a difference of opinion between the parties.

Historically the theory of actual division of the sentence is connected with the logical analysis of the proposition. The principal parts of the proposition, as is known, are the logical subject and the logical predicate. These, like the theme and the rheme, may or may not coincide, respectively, with the subject and the predicate of the sentence. The logical categories of subject and predicate are prototypes of the linguistic categories of theme and rheme. However, if logic analyses its categories of subject and predicate as the meaningful components of certain forms of thinking, linguistics analyses the categories of theme and rheme as the corresponding means of expression used by the speaker for the sake of rendering the informative content of his communications.

The actual division of the sentence finds its full expression only in a concrete context of speech, therefore it is sometimes referred to as the "contextual" division of the sentence. This can be illustrated by the following example: Mary is fond of poetry.

In the cited sentence, if we approach it as a stylistically neutral construction devoid of any specific connotations, the theme is expressed by the subject, and the rheme, by the predicate. This kind of actual division is "direct". On the other hand, a certain context may be built around the given sentence in the conditions of which the order of actual division will be changed into the reverse: the subject will turn into the exposer of the rheme, while the predicate, accordingly, into the exposer of the theme. Cf.: "Isn't it surprising that Tim is so fond of poetry?" -- "But you are wrong. Mary is fond of poetry, not Tim."

The actual division in which the rheme is expressed by the subject is to be referred to as "inverted".

The close connection of the actual division of the sentence with the context in the conditions of which it is possible to divide the informative parts of the communication into those "already known" by the listener and those "not yet known" by him, gave cause to the recognised founder of the linguistic theory of actual division J. Mathesius to consider this kind of sentence division as a purely semantic factor sharply opposed to the "formally grammatical" or "purely syntactic" division of the sentence (in our terminology called its "nominative" division).

One will agree that the actual division of the sentence will really lose all connection with syntax if its components are to be identified solely on the principle of their being "known" or "unknown" to the listener. However, we must bear in mind that the informative value of developing speech consists not only in introducing new words that denote things and phenomena not mentioned before; the informative value of communications lies also in their disclosing various new relations between the elements of reflected events, though the elements themselves may be quite familiar to the listener. The expression of a certain aspect of these relations, namely, the correlation of the said elements from the point of view of their immediate significance in a given utterance produced as a predicative item of a continual speech, does enter the structural plane of language. This expression becomes part and parcel of the structural system of language by the mere fact that the correlative informative significance of utterance components are rendered by quite definite, generalised and standardised lingual constructions. The functional purpose of such constructions is to reveal the meaningful centre of the utterance (i.e. its rheme) in distinction to the starting point of its content (i.e. its theme).

These constructions do not present any "absolutely formal", "purely differential" objects of language which are filled with semantic content only in the act of speech communication. On the contrary, they are bilateral signemic units in exactly the same sense as other meaningful constructions of language, i.e. they are distinguished both by their material form and their semantics. It follows from this that the constructional, or immediately systemic side of the phenomenon which is called the "actual division of the sentence" belongs to no other sphere of language than syntax. And the crucial syntactic destination of the whole aspect of the actual division is its rheme-identifying function, since an utterance is produced just for the sake of conveying the meaningful content expressed by its central informative part, i.e. by the rheme.

Among the formal means of expressing the distinction between the theme and the rheme investigators name such structural elements of language as word-order patterns, intonation contours, constructions with introducers, syntactic patterns of contrastive complexes, constructions with articles and other determiners, constructions with intensifying particles.

The difference between the actual division of sentences signalled by the difference in their word-order patterns can be most graphically illustrated by the simplest type of transformations. Cf.:

The winner of the competition stood on the platform in the middle of the hall. > On the platform in the middle of the hall stood the winner of the competition. Fred didn't notice the flying balloon. > The one who didn't notice the flying balloon was Fred. Helen should be the first to receive her diploma. > The first to receive her diploma should be Helen.

In all the cited examples, i.e. both base sentences and their transforms, the rheme (expressed either by the subject or by an element of the predicate group) is placed towards the end of the sentence, while the theme is positioned at the beginning of it. This kind of positioning the components of the actual division corresponds to the natural development of thought from the starting point of communication to its semantic centre, or, in common parlance, from the "known data" to the "unknown (new) data". Still, in other contextual conditions, the reversed order of positioning the actual division components is used, which can be shown by the following illustrative transformations:

It was unbelievable to all of them. > Utterly unbelievable it was to all of them. Now you are speaking magic words, Nancy. > Magic words you are speaking now, Nancy. You look so well! > How well you look!

It is easily seen from the given examples that the reversed order of the actual division, i.e. the positioning of the rheme at the beginning of the sentence, is connected with emphatic speech.

Among constructions with introducers, the there-pattern provides for the rhematic identification of the subject without emotive connotations. Cf.:

Tall birches surrounded the lake. > There were tall birches surrounding the lake. A loud hoot came from the railroad. > There came a loud hoot from the railroad.

Emphatic discrimination of the rheme expressed by various parts of the sentence is achieved by constructions with the anticipatory it. Cf.:

Grandma gave them a moment's deep consideration. > It was a moment's deep consideration that Grandma gave them. She had just escaped something simply awful. ~* It was something simply awful that she had just escaped. At that moment Laura joined them. > It was Laura who joined them at that moment.

Syntactic patterns of contrastive complexes are used to expose the rheme of the utterance in cases when special accuracy of distinction is needed. This is explained by the fact that the actual division as such is always based on some sort of antithesis or "contraposition" (see further), which in an ordinary speech remains implicit. Thus, a syntactic contrastive complex is employed to make explicative the inner contrast inherent in the actual division by virtue of its functional nature. This can be shown on pairs of nominatively cognate examples of antithetic constructions where each member-construction will expose its own contrastively presented element. Cf.:

The costume is meant not for your cousin, but for you.

The costume, not the frock, is meant for you, my dear.

The strain told not so much on my visitor than on myself.

The strain of the situation, not the relaxation of it, was

what surprised me.

Determiners, among them the articles, used as means of forming certain patterns of actual division, divide their functions so that the definite determiners serve as identifiers of the theme while the indefinite determiners serve as identifiers of the rheme. Cf.:

The man walked up and down the platform. ---- A man walked up and down the platform. The whole book was devoted to the description of a tiny island on the Pacific.

A whole book is needed to describe that tiny island on the Pacific. I'm sure Nora's knitting needles will suit you. -- I'm sure any knitting needles will suit you.

Intensifying particles identify the rheme, commonly imparting emotional colouring to the whole of the utterance. Cf.:

Mr. Stores had a part in the general debate. > Even Mr. Stores had a part in the general debate. Then he sat down in one of the armchairs. > Only then did he sit down in one of the armchairs. We were impressed by what we heard and saw. > We were so impressed by what we heard and saw.

As for intonation as a means of realising the actual division, it might appear that its sphere is relatively limited, being confined to oral speech only. On closer consideration, however, this view of rheme-identifying role of intonation proves inadequate. To appreciate the true status of intonation in the actual division of the sentence, one should abstract oneself from "paper syntax" (description of written texts) and remember that it is phonetical speech, i.e. articulately pronounced utterances that form the basis of human language as a whole. As soon as the phonetical nature of language is duly taken account of, intonation with its accent-patterns presents itself not as a limited, but as a universal and indisputable means of expressing the actual division in all types and varieties of lingual contexts. This universal rheme-identifying function of intonation has been described in treatises on logic, as well as in traditional philological literature, in terms of "logical accent". The "logical accent", which amounts linguistically to the "rhematic accent", is inseparable from the other rheme-identifying means described above, especially from the word-order patterns. Moreover, all such means in written texts in fact represent the logical accent, i.e. they indicate its position either directly or indirectly. This can be seen on all the examples hitherto cited in the present chapter.

While recognising the logical accent as a means of effecting the actual division, we must strictly distinguish between the elements immediately placed under the phonetical, "technical" stress, and the sentence segments which are identified as the informative centre of communication in the true sense of the term.

Technically, not only notional, but functional units as well can be phrasally stressed in an utterance, which in modern printed texts is shown by special graphical ways of identification, such as italics, bold type, etc. Cf.:

"I can't bring along someone who isn't invited." -- "But I am invited!" said Miss Casement (I. Murdoch). Moreover, being a highly intelligent young woman, she'd be careful not to be the only one affected (Л. Christie).

However, it would be utterly incorrect to think that in such instances only those word-units are logically, i.e. rhematically, marked out as are stressed phonetically. As a matter of fact, functional elements cannot express any self-dependent nomination; they do not exist by themselves, but make up units of nomination together with the notional elements of utterances whose meanings they specify. Thus, the phrasal phonetical stress, technically making prominent some functional element, thereby identifies as rhematic the corresponding notional part ("knot") of the utterance as a whole. It is such notional parts that are real members of the opposition "theme -- rheme", not their functional constituents taken separately. As for the said functional constituents themselves, these only set up specific semantic bases on which the relevant rhematic antitheses are built up.

The actual division, since it is effected upon the already produced nominative sentence base providing for its contextually relevant manifestation, enters the predicative aspect of the sentence. It makes up part of syntactic predication, because it strictly meets the functional purpose of predication as such, which is to relate the nominative content of the sentence to reality (see Ch. XXI). This predicative role of the actual division shows that its contextual relevance is not reduced to that of a passive, concomitant factor of expression. On the contrary, the actual division is an active means of expressing functional meanings, and, being organically connected with the context, it is not so much context-governed as it is |context-governing: in fact, it does build up concrete contexts out of constructional sentence-models chosen to reflect different situations and events.

One of the most important manifestations of the immediate contextual relevance of the actual division is the regular deletion (ellipsis) of the thematic parts of utterances in dialogue speech. By this syntactic process, the rheme of the utterance or its most informative part (peak of informative perspective) is placed in isolation, thereby being very graphically presented to the listener. Cf.:

"You've got the letters?" -- "In my bag" (G. W. Target). "How did you receive him?" -- "Coldly" (J. Galsworthy).

In other words, the thematic reduction of sentences in the context, resulting in a constructional economy of speech, performs an informative function in parallel with the logical accent: it serves to accurately identify the rheme of the utterance.

CHAPTER XXIII. COMMUNICATIVE TYPES OF SENTENCES

The sentence is a communicative unit, therefore the primary classification of sentences must be based on the communicative principle. This principle is formulated in traditional grammar as the "purpose of communication".

The purpose of communication, by definition, refers to the sentence as a whole, and the structural features connected with the expression of this sentential function belong to the fundamental, constitutive qualities of the sentence as a lingual unit.

In accord with the purpose of communication three cardinal sentence-types have long been recognised in linguistic tradition: first, the declarative sentence; second, the imperative (inducive) sentence; third, the interrogative sentence. These communicative sentence-types stand in strict opposition to one another, and their inner properties of form and meaning are immediately correlated with the corresponding features of the listener's responses.

Thus, the declarative sentence expresses a statement, either affirmative or negative, and as such stands in systemic syntagmatic correlation with the listener's responding signals of attention, of appraisal (including agreement or disagreement), of fellow-feeling. Cf.:

"I think," he said, "that Mr. Desert should be asked to give us his reasons for publishing that poem." -- "Hear, hear!" said the К. С. (J. Galsworthy). "We live very quietly here, indeed we do; my niece here will tell you the same." -- "Oh, come, I'm not such a fool as that," answered the squire (D. du Maurier).

The imperative sentence expresses inducement, either affirmative or negative. That is, it urges the listener, in the form of request or command, to perform or not to perform a certain action. As such, the imperative sentence is situationally connected with the corresponding "action response" (Ch. Fries), and lingually is systemically correlated with a verbal response showing that the inducement is either complied with, or else rejected. Cf.:

"Let's go and sit down up there, Dinny." -- "Very well" (J. Galsworthy). "Then marry me." -- "Really, Alan, I never met anyone with so few ideas" (J. Galsworthy). "Send him back!" he said again. -- "Nonsense, old chap" (J. Aldridge).

Since the communicative purpose of the imperative sentence is to make the listener act as requested, silence on the part of the latter (when the request is fulfilled), strictly speaking, is also linguistically relevant. This gap in speech, which situationally is filled in by the listener's action, is set off in literary narration by special comments and descriptions. Cf.:

"Knock on the wood." -- Retan's man leaned forward and knocked three times on the barrera (E. Hemingway). "Shut the piano," whispered Dinny; "let's go up." -- Diana closed the piano without noise and rose (J. Galsworthy).

The interrogative sentence expresses a question, i.e. a request for information wanted by the speaker from the listener. By virtue of this communicative purpose, the interrogative sentence is naturally connected with an answer, forming together with it a question-answer dialogue unity. Cf.:

"What do you suggest I should do, then?" said Mary helplessly. -- "If I were you I should play a waiting game," he replied (D. du Maurier).

Naturally, in the process of actual communication the interrogative communicative purpose, like any other communicative task, may sporadically not be fulfilled. In case it is not fulfilled, the question-answer unity proves to be broken; instead of a needed answer the speaker is faced by silence on the part of the listener, or else he receives the latter's verbal rejection to answer. Cf.:

"Why can't you lay off?" I said to her. But she didn't even notice me (R. P. Warren). "Did he know about her?" -- "You'd better ask him" (S. Maugham).

Evidently, such and like reactions to interrogative sentences are not immediately relevant in terms of environmental syntactic featuring.

An attempt to revise the traditional communicative classification of sentences was made by the American scholar Ch. Fries who classed them, as a deliberate challenge to the "accepted routine", not in accord with the purposes of communication, but according to the responses they elicit [Fries, 29-53].

In Fries's system, as a universal speech unit subjected to communicative analysis was chosen not immediately a sentence, but an utterance unit (a "free" utterance, i.e. capable of isolation) understood as a continuous chunk of talk by one speaker in a dialogue. The sentence was then defined as a minimum free utterance.

Utterances collected from the tape-recorded corpus of dialogues (mostly telephone conversations) were first classed into "situation utterances" (eliciting a response), and "response utterances". Situation single free utterances (i.e. sentences) were further divided into three groups:

1) Utterances that are regularly followed by oral responses only. These are greetings, calls, questions. E.g.:

Hello! Good-bye! See you soon! ... Dad! Say, dear! Colonel Howard! ... Have you got moved in? What are you going to do for the summer? ...

2) Utterances regularly eliciting action responses. These are requests or commands. E.g.:

Read that again, will you? Oh, wait a minute! Please have him call Operator Six when he comes in! Will you see just exactly what his status is?

3) Utterances regularly eliciting conventional signals of attention to continuous discourse. These are statements. E.g.:

I've been talking with Mr. D -- in the purchasing department about our type-writer. (--Yes?). That order went in March seventh. However it seems that we are about eighth on the list. (-- I see). Etc.

Alongside of the described "communicative" utterances, i.e. utterances directed to a definite listener, another, minor type of utterances were recognised as not directed to any listener but, as Ch. Fries puts it, "characteristic of situations such as surprise, sudden pain, disgust, anger, laughter, sorrow" [Fries, 53]. E.g.: Oh, oh! Goodness! My God! Darn! Gosh! Etc.

Such and like interjectional units were classed by Ch. Fries as "noncommunicative" utterances.

Observing the given classification, it is not difficult to see that, far from refuting or discarding the traditional classification of sentences built up on the principle of the "purpose of communication", it rather confirms and specifies it. Indeed, the very purpose of communication inherent in the addressing sentence is reflected in the listener's response. The second and third groups of Ch, Fries's "communicative" sentences-utterances are just identical imperative and declarative types both by the employed names and definition. As for the first group, it is essentially heterogeneous, which is recognised by the investigator himself, who distinguishes in its composition three communicatively different subgroups. One of these ("C") is constituted by "questions", i.e. classical interrogative sentences. The other two, viz. greetings ("A") and calls ("B"), are syntactically not cardinal, but, rather, minor intermediary types, making up the periphery of declarative sentences (greetings -- statements of conventional goodwill at meeting and parting) and imperative sentences (calls -- requests for attention). As regards "non-communicative" utterances -- interjectional units, they are devoid of any immediately expressed intellective semantics, which excludes them from the general category of sentence as such (see further).

Thus, the undertaken analysis should, in point of fact, be looked upon as an actual application of the notions of communicative sentence-types to the study of oral speech, resulting in further specifications and development of these notions.

Alongside of the three cardinal communicative sentence-types, another type of sentences is recognised in the theory of syntax, namely, the so-called exclamatory sentence. In modern linguistics it has been demonstrated that exclamatory sentences do not possess any complete set of qualities that could place them on one and the same level with the three cardinal communicative types of sentences. The property of exclamation should be considered as an accompanying feature which is effected within the system of the three cardinal communicative types of sentences.* In other words, each of the cardinal communicative sentence types can be represented in the two variants, viz. non-exclamatory and exclamatory. For instance, with the following exclamatory sentences-statements it is easy to identify their non-exclamatory declarative prototypes:

What a very small cabin it was! (K. Mansfield) - It was a very small cabin. How utterly she had lost count of events! (J. Galsworthy) <- She had lost count of events. Why, if it isn't my lady! (J. Erskine) «-- It is my lady.

Similarly, exclamatory questions are immediately related in the syntactic system to the corresponding non-exclamatory interrogative sentences. E.g.:

Whatever do you mean, Mr. Critchlow? (A. Bennett) «-What do you mean? Then why in God's name did you come? (K. Mansfield) «- Why did you come?

Imperative sentences, naturally, are characterised by a higher general degree of emotive intensity than the other two cardinal communicative sentence-types. Still, they form analogous pairs, whose constituent units are distinguished from each other by no other feature than the presence or absence of exclamation as such. E.g.:

Francis, will you please try to speak sensibly! (E. Hemingway) «- Try to speak sensibly. Don't you dare to compare me to common people! (B. Shaw) <-- Don't compare me to common people. Never so long as you live say I made you do that! (J. Erskine) <-- Don't say I made you do that.

As is seen from the given examples, all the three pairs of variant communicative types of sentences (non-exclamatory -- exclamatory for each cardinal division) make up distinct semantico-syntactic oppositions effected by regular grammatical means of language, such as intonation, word-order and special constructions with functional-auxiliary lexemic elements. It follows from this that the functional-communicative classification of sentences specially distinguishing emotive factor should discriminate, on the lower level of analysis, between the six sentence-types forming, respectively, three groups (pairs) of cardinal communicative quality.

The communicative properties of sentences can further be exposed in the light of the theory of actual division of the sentence.

The actual division provides for the informative content of the utterance to be expressed with the due gradation of its parts according to the significance of their respective role in the context. But any utterance is formed within the framework of the system of communicative types of sentences. And as soon as we compare the communication-purpose aspect of the utterance with its actual division aspect we shall find that each communicative sentence type is distinguished by its specific actual division features, which are revealed first and foremost in the nature of the rheme as the meaningful nucleus of the utterance.

The strictly declarative sentence immediately expresses a certain proposition. By virtue of this, the actual division of the declarative sentence presents itself in the most developed and complete form. The rheme of the declarative sentence makes up the centre of some statement as such. This can be distinctly demonstrated by a question-test directly revealing the rhematic part of an utterance. Cf.: The next instant she had recognised him. > What had she done the next instant?

The pronominal what-question clearly exposes in the example the part "(had) recognised him" as the declarative rheme, for this part is placed within the interrogative-pronominal reference. In other words, the tested utterance with its completed actual division is the only answer to the cited potential question; the utterance has been produced by the speaker just to express the fact of "his being recognised".

Another transformational test for the declarative rheme is the logical superposition. The logical superposition consists in transforming the tested construction into the one where the rheme is placed in the position of the logically emphasised predicate. By way of example let us take the second sentence in the following sequence: And I was very uneasy. All sorts of forebodings assailed me.

The logical superposition of the utterance is effected thus: > What assailed me was all sorts of forebodings.

This test marks out the subject of the utterance "all sorts of forebodings" as the rheme, because it is just this part of the utterance that is placed in the emphatic position of the predicate in the superpositional transform.

Similar diagnostic procedures expose the layer-structure of the actual division in composite syntactic constructions. For instance, in the following complex sentence rhematic question-tests easily reveal the three declarative rhemes on the three consecutive syntactic layers: I knew that Mr, Wade had been very excited by something that he had found out.

Test for the first syntactic layer: What did I know?

Test for the second syntactic layer: What state was Mr. Wade in?

Test for the third syntactic layer: What made him excited? (By what was he excited?)

The strictly imperative sentence, as different from the strictly declarative sentence, does not express by its immediate destination any statement of fact, i.e. any proposition proper. It is only based on a proposition, without formulating it directly. Namely, the proposition underlying the imperative sentence is reversely contrasted against the content of the expressed inducement, since an urge to do something (affirmative inducement) is founded on the premise that something is not done or is otherwise not affected by the wanted action, and, conversely, an urge not to do something (negative inducement) is founded on the directly opposite premise. Cf.:

Let's go out at once! (The premise: We are in.) Never again take that horrible woman into your confidence, Jerry! (The premise: Jerry has taken that horrible woman into his confidence.)

Thus, the rheme of the imperative utterance expresses the informative nucleus not of an explicit proposition, but of an inducement -- a wanted (or unwanted) action together with its referential attending elements (objects, qualities, circumstances).

Due to the communicative nature of the inducement addressed to the listener, its thematic subject is usually zeroed, though it can be represented in the form of direct address. Cf.:

Don't try to sidetrack me (J. Braine). Put that dam* dog down, Fleur; I can't see your face (J. Galsworthy). Kindly tell me what you meant, Wilfrid (J. Galsworthy).

Inducements that include in the address also the speaker himself, or are directed, through the second person medium, to a third person (persons) present their thematic subjects explicit in the construction. E.g.:

I say, Bob, let's try to reconstruct the scene as it developed. Please don't let's quarrel over the speeds now. Let her produce the document if she has it.

The whole composition of an ordinary imperative utterance is usually characterised by a high informative value, so that the rheme proper, or the informative peak, may stand here not so distinctly against the background information as in the declarative utterance. Still, rhematic testing of imperative utterances does disclose the communicative stratification of their constituents. Compare the question-tests of a couple of the cited examples:

Put that dam' dog down, Fleur. > What is Fleur to do with the dog? Kindly tell me what you meant, Wilfrid. > What is Wilfrid to tell the speaker?

As for the thematic, and especially the subrhematic (transitional) elements of the imperative utterance, they often are functionally charged with the type-grading of inducement itself,-i.e.-with making it into a command, prohibition, request, admonition, entreaty, etc. Compare, in addition to the cited, some more examples to this effect:

Let us at least remember to admire each other (L. Hellman). Oh, please stop it... Please, please stop it (E. Hemingway). Get out before I break your dirty little neck (A. Hailey).

The second-person inducement may include the explicit pronominal subject, but such kind of constructions should be defined as of secondary derivation. They are connected with a complicated informative content to be conveyed to the listener-performer, expressing, on the one hand, the choice of the subject out of several persons-participants of the situation, and on the other hand, appraisals rendering various ethical connotations (in particular, the type-grading of inducement mentioned above). Cf.:

"What about me?" she asked. -- "Nothing doing. You go to bed and sleep" (A. Christie). Don't you worry about me, sir. I shall be all right (B..K. Seymour).

At a further stage of complication, the subject of the inducement may be shifted to the position of the rheme. E.g.:

"...We have to do everything we can." -- "You do it," he said. "I'm tired" (E. Hemingway).

The essentially different identifications of the rheme in the two imperative utterances of the cited example can be proved by transformational testing: ... > What we have to do is (to do) everything we can. ... > The person who should do it is you.

The inducement with the rhematic subject of the latter type may be classed as the "(informatively) shifted inducement".

As far as the strictly interrogative sentence is concerned, its actual division is uniquely different from the actual division of both the declarative and the imperative sentence-types.

The unique quality of the interrogative actual division is determined by the fact that the interrogative sentence, instead of conveying some relatively self-dependent content, expresses an inquiry about information which the speaker (as a participant of a typical question-answer situation) does not possess. Therefore the rheme of the interrogative sentence, as the nucleus of the inquiry, is informationally open (gaping); its function consists only in marking the rhematic position in the response sentence and programming the content of its filler in accord with the nature of the inquiry.

Different types of questions present different types of open rhemes.

In the pronominal ("special") question, the nucleus of inquiry is expressed by an interrogative pronoun. The pronoun is immediately connected with the part of the sentence denoting the object or phenomenon about which the inquiry ("condensed" in the pronoun) is made. The gaping pronominal meaning is to be replaced in the answer by the wanted actual information. Thus, the rheme of the answer is the reverse substitute of the interrogative pronoun: the two make up a rhematic unity in the broader question-answer construction. As for the thematic part of the answer, it is already expressed in the question, therefore in common speech it is usually zeroed. E.g.:

"Why do you think so?" -- "Because mostly I keep my eyes open, miss, and I talk to people" (A. Hailey).

The superpositional rhematic test for the pronominal question may be effected in the following periphrastic-definitional form: --» The question about your thinking so is: why?

For the sake of analytical convenience this kind of superposition may be reduced as follows: > You think so -- why?

Compare some more pronominal interrogative superpositions:

What happens to a man like Hawk Harrap as the years go by? (W. Saroyan). > To a man like Hawk Harrap, as the years go by -- what happens? How do you make that out, mother? (E. M. Forster) > You make that out, mother, -- how? How's the weather in the north? (D. du Maurier) > The weather in the north -- how is it? What's behind all this? (A. Hailey) > Behind all this is -- what?

The rheme of non-pronominal questions is quite different from the one described. It is also open, but its openness consists in at least two semantic suggestions presented for choice to the listener. The choice is effected in the response; in other words, the answer closes the suggested alternative according to the interrogative-rhematic program inherent in it. This is clearly seen in the structure of ordinary, explicit alternative questions. E.g.: Will you take it away or open it here? (Th. Dreiser)

The superposition of the utterance may be presented as follows: > You in relation to it -- will take (it) away, will open (it) here?

The alternative question may have a pronominal introduction, emphasising the open character of its rheme. Cf.: In which cave is the offence alleged, the Buddhist or the Jain? (E. M. Forster)

The superposition: > The offence is alleged -- in the Buddhist cave, in the Jain cave?

Thus, in terms of rhematic reverse substitution, the pronominal question is a question of unlimited substitution choice, while the alternative question is a question of a limited substitution choice, the substitution of the latter kind being, as a rule, expressed implicitly. This can be demonstrated by a transformation applied to the first of the two cited examples of alternative questions: Will you take it away or open it here? > Where will you handle it -- take it away or open it here?

The non-pronominal question requiring either confirmation or negation ("general" question of yes-no response type) is thereby implicitly alternative, though the inquiry inherent in it concerns not the choice between some suggested facts, but the choice between the existence or non-existence of an indicated fact. In other words, it is a question of realised rhematic substitution (or of "no substitution choice"), but with an open existence factor (true to life or not true to life?), which makes up its implicitly expressed alternative. This can be easily shown by a superposition; Are they going to stay long? > They are going to stay -- long, not long?

The implicit alternative question can be made into an explicit one, which as a rule is very emphatic, i.e. stylistically "forced". The negation in the implied alternative part is usually referred to the verb. Cf.: > Are they going to stay long, or are they not going to stay long?

The cited relation of this kind of question to interrogative reverse substitution (and, together with it, the open character of its rheme) is best demonstrated by the corresponding pronominal transformation: > How long are they going to stay -- long (or not long)?

As we see, the essential difference between the two types of alternative questions, the explicit one and the implicit one, remains valid even if the latter is changed into an explicit alternative question (i.e. into a stylistically forced explicit alternative question). This difference is determined by the difference in the informative composition of the interrogative constructions compared.

In general terms of meaning, the question of the first type (the normal explicit alternative question) should be classed as the alternative question of fact, since a choice between two or more facts is required by it; the question of the second type (the implicit alternative question) should be classed as the alternative question of truth, since it requires the statement of truth or non-truth of the indicated fact. In terms of actual division, the question of the first type should be classed as the polyperspective alternative question (biperspective, triperspective, etc.), because it presents more than one informative perspectives (more than one actual divisions) for the listener's choice; the question of the second type, as opposed to the polyperspective, should be classed as the monoperspective alternative question, because its both varieties (implicit and explicit) express only one informative perspective, which is presented to the listener for the existential yes-no appraisal.

§ 6. The exposition of the fundamental role of actual division in the formation of the communicative sentence types involves, among other things, the unequivocal refutation of recognising by some linguists the would-be "purely exclamatory sentence" that cannot be reduced to any of the three demonstrated cardinal communicative types.*

Indeed, by "purely exclamatory sentences" are meant no other things than interjectional exclamations of ready-made order such as "Great Heavens!", "Good Lord!", "For God's sake!" "Fiddle-dee-dee!", "Oh, I say!" and the like, which, due to various situational conditions, find themselves in self-dependent, proposemically isolated positions in the text. Cf.:

"Oh, for God's sake!" -- "Oh, for God's sake!" the boy had repeated (W. Saroyan). "Ah!" said Lady Mont. "That reminds me" (J. Galsworthy).

As is seen from the examples, the isolated positions of the interjectional utterances do not make them into any meaningfully articulate, grammatically predicated sentences with their own informative perspective (either explicit, or implicit). They remain not signals of proposemically complete thoughts, not "communicative utterances" (see above), but mere symptoms of emotions, consciously or unconsciously produced shouts of strong feelings. Therefore the highest rank that they deserve in any relevant linguistic classification of "single free units of speech" is "non-sentential utterances" (which is just another name for Ch. Fries's "noncommunicative utterances").

Of quite another nature are exclamatory sentences with emphatic introducers derived on special productive syntactic patterns. Cf.:

Oh, that Mr. Thornspell hadn't been so reserved! How silly of you! If only I could raise the necessary sum! Etc.

These constructions also express emotions, but they are meaningfully articulate and proposemically complete. They clearly display a definite nominative composition which is predicated, i.e. related to reality according to the necessary grammatical regularities. And they inevitably belong to quite a definite communicative type of sentences, namely, to the declarative type.

The vast set of constructional sentence models possessed by language is formed not only by cardinal, mono-functional communicative types; besides these, it includes also intermediary predicative constructions distinguished by mixed communicative features. The true nature of such intermediary constructions can be disclosed in the light of the actual division theory combined with the general theory of paradigmatic oppositions.

Observations conducted on the said principles show that intermediary communicative sentence models may be identified between all the three cardinal communicative correlations (viz., statement -- question, statement -- inducement, inducement -- question); they have grown and are sustained in language as a result of the transference of certain characteristic features from one communicative type of sentences to another.

In the following dialogue sequence the utterance which is declarative by its formal features, at the same time contains a distinct pronominal question:

"I wonder why they come to me about it. That's your job, sweetheart." -- I looked up from Jasper, my face red as fire. "Darling," I said, "I meant to tell you before, but -- but I forgot" (D. du Maurier).

Semantic-syntactic comparison of the two utterances produced by the participants of the cited dialogue clearly shows in the initial utterance the features inherently peculiar to the interrogative communicative type, namely, its open rhematic part ("why they come to me about it") and the general programming character of its actual division in relation to the required response.

Compare some more examples of a similar nature:

"But surely I may treat him as a human being." -- "Most certainly not" (B. Shaw), "I don't disturb you, I hope, Mr Cokane." -- "By no means" (B. Shaw). "Wait a second, you haven't told me your address." -- "Oh, I'm staying at the Hotel du Phare" (A. Christie), "I should like to hear your views on that," replied Utterson (R. L. Stevenson).

As is seen from the examples, utterances intermediary between statements and questions convey meanings and connotations that supplement the direct programming of the answer effected by strictly monofunctional, cardinal interrogative constructions. Namely, they render the connotation of insistency in asking for information, they express a more definite or lass definite supposition of the nature of information possessed by the listener, they present a suggestion to the listener to perform a certain action or imply a request for permission to perform an action, etc.

On the other hand, in the structural framework of the interrogative sentence one can express a statement. This type of utterance is classed as the "rhetorical question" -- an expressive construction that has been attracting the closest attention of linguistic observers since ancient times.

A high intensity of declarative functional meaning expressed by rhetorical questions is best seen in various proverbs and maxims based on this specifically emphatic predicative unit. Cf.:

Can a leopard change his spots? Can man be free if woman be a slave? O shame! Where is thy blush? Why ask the Bishop when the Pope's around? Who shall decide when the doctors disagree?

Compare rhetorical questions in stylistically freer, more common forms of speech:

That was my mission, you imagined. It was not, but where was I to go? (O. Wilde) That was all right; I meant what I said. Why should I feel guilty about it? (J. Braine) How could I have ever thought I could get away with it! (J. Osborne)

It should be noted that in living speech responses to rhetorical questions exactly correspond to responses elicited by declarative sentences: they include signals of attention, appraisals, expressions of fellow feeling, etc. Cf.:

"How can a woman be expected to be happy with a man who insists on treating her as if she were a perfectly rational being?" -- "My dear!" (O. Wilde)

A rhetorical question in principle can be followed by a direct answer, too. However, such an answer does not fill up the rheme of the rhetorical question (which, as different from the rheme of a genuine question, is not at all open), but emphatically accentuates its intensely declarative semantic nature. An answer to a rhetorical question also emphasises its affirmative or negative implication which is opposite to the formal expression of affirmation or negation in the outer structure of the question. Cf.: "What more can a gentleman desire in this world?" -- "Nothing more, I am quite sure" (O. Wilde).

Due to these connotations, the answer to a rhetorical question can quite naturally be given by the speaker himself: Who, being in love, is poor? Oh, no one (O. Wilde).

The declarative nature of the rhetorical question is revealed also in the fact that it is not infrequently used as an answer to a genuine question -- namely, in cases when an expressive, emphatic answer is needed. Cf.: "Do you expect to save the country, Mr Mangan?" -- "Well, who else will?" (B. Shaw)

Rhetorical questions as constructions of intermediary communicative nature should be distinguished from such genuine questions as are addressed by the speaker to himself in the process of deliberation and reasoning. The genuine quality of the latter kind of questions is easily exposed by observing the character of their rhematic elements. E.g.: Had she had what was called a complex all this time? Or was love always sudden like this? A wild flower seeding on a wild wind? (J. Galsworthy)